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TECHNOLOGIES FOR AIRLINE 
SECURITY 
XAVIER K. MARUYAMlA 
Institute for Joint Warfare Analysis 
and 
Dept. of Physics 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, California 
ABSTRACT 
Aviation Safety and Security has become a topic of paramount national concern. 
Informed decision making requires an appreciation of trends in technology in response to 
projected future terrorist activities, In the area of security, explosive detection is made 
possible by a bewildering array of newly offered equipment from industrial vendors and 
government and academic laboratories. Techniques such as ion mass spectrometry, gas 
chromatography, electromagnetic induction, thermal neutron analysis, fast pulsed neutron 
analysis, infrared cameras, x-ray computer assisted tomography, transmission and back 
scattered tomography and microwave radar techniques, as well as the use of dogs, for the 
detection of explosives, drugs and other contraband are offered in a bewildering variety 
to the airline industry. It is hoped that this document will serve as a primer describing the 
science and engineering of what is involved in the various technologies. Here, the goal is 
not so much a scientific engineering text, but a translation of scientific and engineering 
descriptions into a language which the educated general public can understand. This 
primer has been written with two levels in mind. There would be one level which could 
be appreciated by a non-technical person, and a second level which could be appreciated 




The "battlefield" of the twenty-first century is no longer confined to locations 
where massed armies or navies confront each other. One of the most unpleasant facts of 
the world today is the prevalence of unconventional warfare where civilians and civil 
infrastructure are targeted. In many instances, these are manifest as terrorist acts. 
Because of media coverage and the associated publicity, the most spectacular criminal 
terrorist acts are often committed against civil aviation. 
Protection of the general public from these criminal acts no longer are confined to 
enforced police functions. Technology increasingly plays a role and many professionals 
are required to make decisions which affect aviation security. Sometimes these decisions 
are made inadvertently because the person making the decision understands only a 
particular aspect, such as budgeting, but is not an expert on other dimensions such as 
technical utility. Aviation security demands that the total system be effective. Local 
optimization many times does not lead to the best implementation of resources. It is a 
difficult task for any individual to understand all the ramification of any a particular 
decision, but awareness of other parts which are affected by their decisions can lead to 
more sensible systems. 
Hopefully, this manuscript will provide an understandable description which can 
be appreciated by the non-specialist who needs to interface with those who work in 
aviation security. Detailed referencing and documentation is not provided, because those 




Technology for explosive detection changes constantly, and the best products at 
any particular time may not be the best at a later date. The science and technology 
associated with various devices are described in this work, but a conscious attempt has 
been made to avoid naming particular products or companies, so that the reader is not 
unduly influenced by this writing when making decisions which require more informed 
product selection decisions. It is the intent of the author that, after reading this work, the 
reader will feel sufficiently informed and knowledgeable in the subject of explosive 
detection for aviation security to engage in more meaningful discussions and studies as 
required in his present position. 
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The loss of airplanes due to terrorist use of explosives in the later half of the 
1980’s decade caused the U.S. Federal Government to direct attention to the problem of 
aviation security. The Congressional Office of Technology Assessment (now defunct) 
produced two in-depth assessment studies concerning aviation, airline security, 
technology and the terrorism, Technology Against Terrorism, Z?ze Federal Efort, 1991, 
and Technology Against Terrorism, Structuring Security, 1992. The FAA Technical 
Center conducted the first and second International Symposium on Explosive Detection 
Technology in 1991 and in 1996. The White House Commission on Aviation Safety and 
Security was chartered on July 25, 1996, and issued a final report on February 12, 1997. 
These efforts focussed on aspects pertaining to policy, technical details and integration of 
security systems. 
These and other efforts lead one to conclude that a combination of systems 
incorporating passenger profiling, bag matching and bomb detection technologies could 
be developed to significantly increase airline security. The throughput rate of individual 
explosives or bomb detection devices is not an appropriate parameter to regulate, but 
what is important is the throughput of the entire security system. These findings tell us 
that there is no single “silver bullet” technological fix for the airline security problem. 
Instruments have been and are being developed for airline security. These can be 
considerably complicated from an engineering standpoint, but need not be 
incomprehensible “black boxes” for the educated decision maker who must make choices 
in the use of technology to enhance airline security. The purpose of this work is to 
explain the science of the technology incorporated into airline security systems so that the 
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physics, chemistry and engineering tradeoffs can be understood and appreciated by most 
readers. 
History 1 
Public awareness incidence of terrorist acts against civil aviation has intensified 
since the tragic incident on December 21, 1988, over Lockerbie, Scotland in the 
destruction of Pan Am Flight 103 in which 1 1  villagers and all 259 passengers enroute 
from Frankfurt to New York were killed. It was the worst civil aviation disaster ever in 
Britain and one of the worst in the history of civil aviation. Subsequent investigation 
established that the explosion was caused by a small amount of Semtex carried in the 
airliner’s forward cargo hold. The crash of TWA 800 on July 17, 1996, raised the specter 
of an on board explosive being the cause. Although the latter was determined not to have 
been caused by a terrorist act, the public sense for the need for explosive detection 
technologies at airports was heightened. 
Public awareness has increased when the carriers are American, but less so with 
other carriers, even though American lives have been lost. On September 19, 1989, UTA 
Flight 772 was destroyed over the Sahara Desert over Niger and Avianca Flight 203 was 
destroyed just after take off from Bogota, Columbia on a flight to Cali on November 27, 
1989. The greatest loss of life was due to the destruction of a Boeing 747 operated by 
Air India on June 23, 1985. Flight FL310 was destroyed over the Atlantic Ocean killing 
all 329 occupants by an explosion caused by a bomb placed on board by a Sikh terrorist. 
1 A comprehensive listing of bombings on aircraft may be found at the website: 
http ://home .eunet. no/-steinesa/Andre/Bomb/bomb . htm# 1 989 (accessed 412 1 /OO) 
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Explosions aboard aircraft resulting from acts of aviation sabotage have been 
systematically tracked since May 7, 1947, when a time bomb delivered to a Philippines 
Airlines aircraft by two ex-convicts who were hired by a woman and a man attempting to 
kill the husband, a passenger on the aircraft. In that event 13 passengers were killed. The 
first recorded hijacking was in May 1930 by Peruvian revolutionaries who seized a mail 
plane belonging to Pan American. The pilot, 22-year-o1dy Byron D. Richards, tricked the 
rebels into allowing him to deliver the mail and refused to fly on for the purpose of 
dropping propaganda leaflets over Lima. Thirty years later, the same pilot was 
instrumental in preventing the hijack by the Bearden father and son of a Continental 
Airlines jumbo jet from El Paso, Texas to Cuba. The long history of hijacking and 
aviation sabotage made the need to prevent the introduction of explosives onboard 
airplanes apparent to the industry, government and the flying public, but the best means 
to accomplish this goal is still a matter for discussion. 
Although skyjacking were alarmingly common with 147 reported between 1967 
and 1972, there were no security checkpoints to examine contents of passengers. On 
November 24, 1971, a man bought a $20 ticket for a flight from Portland to Tacoma 
using the name, Dan Cooper. A law enforcement officer erroneously referred to him as 
“D.B.” and the initials stuck. D.B. Cooper passed a note to a flight attendant, as the jet 
became airborne. She thought he was hitting on her so she slipped it, unopened, into her 
pocket. Cooper told her to look at the note and informed her that he had a bomb. D.B. 
Cooper opened his brief case and revealed several red cylinders and a nest of wires. The 
note demanded $200,000 and four parachutes and that the plane be emptied except for 
him and four crewmembers. 
D.B. Cooper received 10,000 in $20 bills when the plane landed at Seattle- 
Tacoma International Airport. Once the plane was refueled, Cooper instructed the pilot 
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to fly towards Mexico at an altitude no higher than 10,000 feet with wing flaps down so 
that the plane flew at a speed slower than 200 miles per hour. The Boeing 727 was the 
only jet in which the stairwell could be opened in mid-flight. He jumped into the strong 
freezing winds somewhere above the small community of Ariel, Washington. ’ D.B. 
Cooper has not been heard from since, although $5880 of his loot was found by a boy 
playing on the banks of the Columbia River in 1980. 
Skyjacking was hardly an original crime. There were 40 in 1969 and more than 
25 in the year Cooper did it. Up to this time, skyjacking had been a political crime, but 
D.B. Cooper helped to introduce greed and used the threat of a bomb rather than a gun. 
His parachute getaway elevated him to cult hero status, with a song, movie and 
celebrations in restaurants and bars in Salt Lake City, San Jose and in Ariel. D.B. 
Cooper’s escapade was a major event that brought to public awareness the need for 
airline security and the need for passenger screening. 
On 29 November 1987, Korean Air Lines Flight 858 exploded in mid-air over the 
Andaman Sea killing all 115 on board. A woman passenger, who had disembarked with 
her elderly companion at Abu Dhabi, later confessed that they had planted the bomb 
when they boarded at Baghdad. She stated that the operation had been planned by North 
Korean Intelligence Operations. The importance of scrutiny at each point on the itinerary 
of an airplane was made evident in this case. 
The El Al Flight 016 incident of April 17, 1986, is often cited as an example for 
the case that proper scrutiny can be effective in preventing acts of airline terrorism. In 
that incident, a pregnant 19-year-old Anne-Marie. Murphy was driven to the airport by her 
fiance, Nezar Hindawi, to Heathrow International Airport for a flight to Israel. She 
accepted from him an overnight bag full of gifts for Hindawi’s family in Israel. As she 
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said good-bye, she was totally unaware of the bag’s false bottom containing 1.5 
kilograms of Grade-A explosives rigged to a timer concealed in a calculator set to 
detonate in flight above the Swiss Alps. An alert guard found Murphy - a non-Jewish 
pregnant woman traveling alone - to be quite suspicious and initiated the questioning and 
searches which revealed the explosive device. Evidence at the subsequent trial of 
Hindawi implicated Syrian intelligence, which had provided the bomb. Now, even 
innocents could be used as dupes for a determined terrorist with no concern for even 
those close to him. 
The pre-flight procedure, while successful in this instance, however takes time 
and intrudes upon each innocent passenger. The airline soon developed an 
uncomplimentary reputation: “El Al” standing for “Every Landing Always Late.” The 
balance between security, privacy and passenger throughput is difficult to maintain. 
Technology coupled with effective policy must be called upon to help to insure passenger 
security against explosives and at the same time insure that airline commerce is not 
unduly hampered. 
FAA guidelines require a system throughput of ten bags per minute, or six 
seconds per bag. As daunting as this requirement is, if a plane is assumed to carry 200 
passengers each checking in 2 bags, then 400 bags must be sent through the system in 40 
minutes. From the perspective of the airline passenger, this translates into a realistic 
minimal arrival time one hour prior to departure at the airport, not counting additional 
time necessary to do other tasks such as finding parking and checking in. This simple 




As the brief history outlined above indicates, airline security clearly needs the 
capability to detect weapons. For the decade previous to the 1 9 8 0 ’ ~ ~  this need was 
fulfilled mainly by the ability to detect metallic objects, which revealed the presence of 
guns and knives. 
However, the awareness of and the use of plastic explosives create a much greater 
challenge today. Among the best known of these plastic explosives, and the one most 
frequently used by terrorists is Semtex, a series of commercial putty explosives produced 
at the huge explosive works in the city of Semptin, Czechoslovakia. These are various 
combinations of pentaerythritoltetranitrate PETN ( C5H8N4Ol2) and RDX (C3HQN606) 
with different binders. These plastic explosives can be molded and disguised as 
innocent-looking objects, from the lining of a handbag to a toy or souvenir. Investigators 
believe that the bomb that destroyed Pan Am Flight 103 over Lockerbie was made of 
Semtex explosive small enough to be easily concealed within a radio-cassette player. 
The use of mineral oil as a plasticiser, for example, reduces the vapor pressure at normal 
temperatures and pressure, making reliable detection very challenging. 
The availability of these more sophisticated explosives requires greater 
technological sophistication in their detection. 
The requirement to detect contraband explosives has an oft-neglected advantage. 
Many of the means for detecting hidden explosives are instrumental in detecting other 
items that pose dangers for the traveling public. For example, incendiaries and 
flammables, while not technically explosives, can be used to create similar consequences 
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on board an airplane. The inspection for explosives can oftentimes reveal the presence of 
these other dangerous items. 
In today’s world, the ability to introduce weapons of mass destruction, WMD, is 
not beyond the capability of terrorist and others with criminal intent. Chemical, 
biological and radiological devices can also be used to cause destruction of aircraft and 
their passengers. Beyond the destructive intent of the criminal mind, the profit generated 
by the illegal drug trade also plays a role in today’s air commerce. Measures intended to 
protect against explosives transport can also be used to detect other illegal and harmfiil 
contraband. Emphasis on a single aspect of aviation security should not neglect aspects, 
which affect the integrated aviation security problem. 
Trade-offs 
A large array of current state-of-the-art detection systems is being developed. 
Each exploit different strengths but are also vulnerable to their own specific weakness 
usually arising from human factors and engineering limitations. Competing with the 
need for a reliable and assured security, combinations of different technologies and 
policy considerations provide promise for an economically and operationally feasible 
system. A secure system, which cannot accommodate a reasonable throughput of 
passengers, can effectively paralyze the air transport system. Currently, a throughput of 
600 bags an hour is often stated as a requirement. If each person carries two bags which 
are required to be inspected on a 300 passenger plane, a throughput of 600 bags using a 
single detection system would mean that only one plane per hour could be processed. For 
any airport, this type of approach would make air transportation a non-viable mode of 
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transport. Sequential screening reduces the number of items requiring time consuming 
critical inspection. 
A combination of passenger profiling, interviews, and matching of passengers 
with baggage could considerably reduce intrusive inspections. “Human factors” oriented 
security is highly labor intensive and may be perceived to intrude upon personal privacy 
and may be perceived to be arbitrarily discriminatory against certain groups. The average 
passenger encounters delays at the airport, not only due to security inspection, but to 
more mundane processes such as traffic congestion, finding adequate and convenient 
parking, check in processing independent of security concerns, weather, cleaning of late 
arriving planes, lack of crews, mechanical breakdowns, and air traffic congestion on the 
tarmac and in the air. Delays required by explosive testing are only one of the myriad of 
imtants encountered by the air traveler, but can be perceived as the most unacceptable 
bottleneck by the traveler if his perceived comfort and tolerance is violated. 
This work will not address these issues directly, but they are mentioned here in 
OOorder to bring to the awareness of the reader that the security system cannot be 
imposed as an isolated problem. 
The technology of explosive detection and security systems is complicated in 
engineering detail, but viewed from a science aspect, the understanding of the underlying 
principles can be comprehended by the educated layman. This treatise will attempt to 
give provide a general understanding of explosive and weapons detection technology to 






Explosions in common parlance usually refers to the release of energy within a 
very short time period. The explosion can come from mechanical, chemical or nuclear 
sources. In this context, even the bursting of a pressurized hull is an explosion. In the 
context of airline security, the distinction between explosions and explosives must be 
clearly made. Whereas explosions may be caused by sources other than explosives, 
explosives cause a violent and sudden release of mechanical energy, in the form of 
pressure and heat, due to chemical reactions. 
CHEMISTRY OF EXPLOSIVES 
Explosives can be categorized as high explosives, but also as propellants and 
pyrotechnics. The chemical reactions is primary the oxidation of a reactant, but 
depending on the specifics of how the reactants are mixed and the environment in which 
they react, the mechanical effects can be considerably different. The understanding of 
explosives is primarily an understanding of the chemical reactions that occur. 
Chemical reactions may be considered as the conversion of reactants to products, 
symbolically written as reactants + products. The internal energy of the reactants is 
different from the internal energy of the product and this difference in internal energies is 
macroscopically manifest as pressure and heat. If the reactants contain more energy than 
the products, then that energy may be released as heat during the reaction. This is called 
an exothermic reaction. Reactions involved in burning and detonation are exothermic. 
The heat released can be transferred to the molecules in the surrounding medium as 
mechanical energy, which manifests itself as pressure. In contrast, when the products 
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contain more internal energy than the reactants, then energy from another source must be 
added in order from the reaction to occur. Such a reaction is called an endothermic 
reaction. 
Burning and detonation are reactions of two types. In the first type, there are two 
separate reactants, a fuel and an oxidizer, which react to form the products. A simple 
example of this is in the burning of methane, a common gas used for cooking, with 
oxygen, which is present in the air. To completely bum one molecule of methane, two 
oxygen molecules (four oxygen atoms) must participate in the reaction. The chemical 
reaction may be written: 
CH4+202 + C02+2H20 
Here a single methane molecule containing one carbon and four hydrogen atoms react 
with two oxygen molecules, each containing two oxygen atoms to form a molecule of 
carbon dioxide and two molecules of water2. 
Note that no atoms appear or disappear in the reaction. The left or original 
reactants contain one carbon, four hydrogen and four oxygen atoms and the same number 
of each of the participating atoms appear on the right or final products. A chemical 
. reaction is the rearranging of the atoms of the original reactant molecules into different 
product molecules. 
. 
The second type of reaction, which is by far the more common in explosives, the 
oxidizer and the fuel are contained together within the same molecule. Almost all 
explosives, with which we are concerned in airline security, may be characterized as a 
2 A molecule of carbon dioxide is a combination of one carbon atom with two oxygen 
atoms and the water molecule contains two hydrogen atoms attached to a single oxygen 
atom. 
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substance which contains its own oxidizer within the initial molecule and is capable of an 
exothermic reaction resulting in a large release of heat. The starting molecule 
decomposes during the reaction and re-forms into products. For example, in the 
decomposition of nitroglycerine, C3HSN309, the reaction may be viewed as resulting in 
the decomposition into three carbon, five hydrogen, three nitrogen and nine oxygen 
atoms which recombine into nitrogen gas, N2, water, HzO, carbon dioxide, C02, and 
oxygen, 02, molecules. The explosion of nitroglycerine may be described with the 
following reaction formula: 
C3HSN309 --* 3C + 5H + 3N + 9 0  + 1.5N2 + 2.5H2O +3CO2 + 0.25 0 2  
More conventionally, the intermediate step is eliminated and only integer 
numbers of molecules appear in the reaction formula and we write the same reaction as: 
4C3HSN309 4 6N2 + 10H20 +12CO2+ 0 2  
Note here again that conservation of atoms applies and there are 12 carbon, 20 hydrogen, 
12 nitrogen, and 36 oxygen atoms on each of the left and right hand sides of the equation. 
However, the number of molecules can increase (or in general, increase or decrease 
depending on the specific reaction.) 
Almost all explosive materials with which we deal are molecules which contain 
carbon, C, hydrogen, H, nitrogen, N, and oxygen, 0, or the combination CHNO. They 
are called organic compounds, meaning that the molecule is built on a skeleton of carbon 
atoms. The detection of explosives generally involves probing the chemistry of a 
suspected substance and determining the presence of these four species. Although these 
four species are in general quite common, explosives have specific characteristic ratios of 
abundances of these atoms so that identification, need not be an insurmountable task. 
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Detonation 
In order for a detonation to occur, the explosive must not only react fast, but must 
also produce gas and heat. Three criteria are necessary: 
The reaction propagates at speed greater than the speed of sound in the 
medium in which.the detonation occurs. 
There is a production gas or gases. 
Heat is produced. 
If any one of these three criteria is not met, a detonation does not occur, even though a 
chemical reaction may take place. 
The reaction propagation velocity for most explosives is between 1 to 9 
kilometers per second, which translates to a non-trivial 0.6 to 5.6 miles per second, which 
is between 2100 to 20,000 miles per hour. As a comparison, the speed or sound in air is a 
third of a kilometer per second or 760 miles per hour. 
In general, gases are 500 to 1000 times less dense than solid or liquid materials, 
so the volume occupied by the detonation product gas is three orders of magnitude 
greater than that volume originally occupied by the explosive. This volume expansion 
does not consider the additional expansion due to the rise in temperature of the reactant 
products. 
Heat generated is normally within the range of 400 to 1200 calories per gram. It 
takes roughly 620 calories to take one gram of water from room temperature to steam. 
To raise the temperature to the boiling point and still keep the water in its liquid form, 
only 80 calories are necessary3. To put this in perspective, a pint of water weighs about a 
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pound, which is 454 grams. There is enough energy in the explosive to bring five to 
fifteen times its weight in water to the boiling point, which may not seem impressive 
except when one realizes that this is done in a time scale of about a tenth of a 
millisecond. In a millisecond, an object dropped has traveled fifty microns, or about the 
width of a human hair. 
Oxygen Balance 
Explosion products are complex with materials being formed both in the direct 
explosion reaction and by subsequent reaction with the surrounding atmosphere. Direct 
products from a chemical explosive usually include the combustion products: carbon 
dioxide (C02), carbon monoxide (CO), water vapor (H20), and molecular nitrogen (Nz). 
The products may also include molecular hydrogen (Hz) and molecular oxygen (02), 
along with nitric oxide (NO). In addition to these relatively stable products, reactive 
species may also be formed including hydroxyl (OH), monatomic hydrogen (H), 
monatomic oxygen (0), and monatomic nitrogen (N), in addition to small amounts of 
ionized gases and associated electrons. These latter are electrically charged and, although 
present in small amounts, they make the initial combustion products electrically 
conductive. 
3 In raising the temperature of water, one must consider the specific heat, which is the 
heat necessary to raise a specific amount of water a specific temperature. For example, it 
takes one calorie of heat to raise one gram of water one degree Centigrade. [The unit, 
centigrade, is identical to the metric unit, Celsius. The centigrade is one hundredth the 
temperature difference between the freezing point and the boiling point of water. The 
temperature unit Celsius is named after the inventor of the temperature scale, Anders 
CeZszus (1 70 1- 1744).] 
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The general formula for a CHNO explosive is C,HhNnO,, where the subscripts 
c,h,n and o are the number atoms in a molecule of the explosive. If all the carbon could 
be burned to form carbon dioxide, C02, the number of oxygen required would be twice 
the number of carbon atoms. Similarly, to bum4 all the hydrogen to form water, H20, 
one oxygen would be required for every two hydrogen atoms. The consumption of all the 
carbon and hydrogen would require that the 2c + h/2 = 0. When this condition is met, 
there is a balance between the oxygen and the fuel. Whatever nitrogen is in the explosive 
can then combine with itself to form diatomic nitrogen molecule. If there is an excess of 
oxygen compared to the fuels, carbon and hydrogen, we describe the explosive as being 
over-oxidized. If there is not enough oxygen to completely bum hydrogen and carbon, 
we call the explosive under-oxidized. This concept can be quantified as a percentage 
oxygen balance, OB, by applying the formula: 
OB (“A) = 100 (1 6/MW) [0-(2c+h/2)] 
Where MW refers to the molecular weight, which is the sum of the atomic weights of all 
the atoms. Since we know the generic formula, C,HhNnO,, the molecular weight of the 
explosive can be easily computed as: 
MW = 12.c + 1.h + 14.11 + 16.0 
For example, applying these formulas to nitroglycerine, C3H5N309 ,molecule, the 
numbers atoms of carbon, c = 3; of hydrogen, h = 5; of nitrogen, n = 14; and of oxygen, o 
= 9 . Consequently, the molecular weights, 
4 Burning is equivalent to oxidation as a chemical process. 
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MW = 12*(3) + 1 * ( 5 )  + 14*(3) + 16*(9) = 227. 
The oxygen balance is then, 
OB (%) = 100 (16flMw) [0-(2c+h/2)] = 100 (16/227) [9- (2*3+5/2)] = 3.5 %, 
telling us that there is a three and a half- percent more oxygen than would be required for 
a completely efficient combustion of the carbon and hydrogen fbel. 
Similarly, for trinitrotoluene, TNT: C7H5N306, c = 7, h = 5, n = J, and o = 6 and 
the molecular weight is: 
MW = 12(7) + l(5) f 15 (3) + 16(6) = 227 
with an oxygen balance, 
OB (%) = 100 (16/MW) [0-(2c+h/2)] = 100 (16/227) [6- (2*7+5/2)] = - 74 %, 
indicating that TNT is very under-oxidized and if the temperature is high enough, the left 
over combustion products can consume the oxygen from the air and produce greater 
explosive effects. Note also that the molecular weights of TNT and nitroglycerine are 
4 In most chemistry books, the atomic and molecular weights are not exact integers as 
presented here. There are two reasons for this discrepancy. First, due to the Einstein 
relationship, E = mc2, equating energy and mass, when the constituent protons and 
neutrons and electrons are joined together into nuclei and atoms, the mass, which is 
equivalent to weight for our purposes, is slightly modified from the sum of the 
constituent masses. Second, atoms can be found as isotopes, each having the same 
number of protons and electrons with identical chemical properties, but having a different 
number of neutrons in the nucleus. The atomic weight is weighted average of the 
isotopic abundance’s as found on the surface of the earth. These two effects cause 
calculational numerical differences, but do not change the concepts conveyed in our 
discussion. Of the two effects, the isotopic effect is larger. 
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identical, but the ratio of the constituent atoms is considerably different. The presence of 
the three nitrogen atoms attached to a benzene type structure (toluene) is the basis for the 
name tri-nitro toluene. 
As the two examples of nitroglycerine and TNT illustrate, nitrogen is found in all 
common explosives. Nitrogen as a gas constitutes approximately 78 % of air, but is 
relatively rare in the solid form. Solids, which have a relatively high nitrogen density 
such as melamine, c3H6N6, have low oxygen density, if at all. Almost all explosive 
detection devices explore the chemistry constituency of the object under search to 
determine if it falls into the CHNO atomic composition with a nitrogen and oxygen 
relative ratio consistent with known explosives. 
Before continuing our discussion of detection characteristics, we digress to 






An explosion is a phenomenon that results from a sudden release of energy. The 
exact source of the energy is relatively immaterial in the manifest effects. It may come 
from an explosive such as TNT, wheat flour dust in a grain elevator, over-pressure of 
steam in a boiler, or the ignition of fumes in an aviation he1 tank. Consequently, the 
determination of the cause of a catastrophic failure of an airplane in flight may require 
considerable detective work before an exact cause can be determined. 
The importance of the suddenness of the release of energy can be appreciated by 
considering from our everyday experience the puncture of a pneumatic tire. If the energy 
release is sudden, as in a blowout, the effect is that of a small explosion and the tire walls 
may be shattered. Any person or object unlucky enough to be in the vicinity may suffer 
injury or damage. If, however, there is a slow release, as by leakage, there is no 
explosion. 
EXPLOSIVE STRENGTH 
In considering explosives, the distinction is made between detonation and 
deflagration. In a detonation, the transfer of energy from the explosive reaction to the 
surrounding medium is primarily mechanical through shock pressure forces. Explosives 
such as TNT, which explode by this mechanism, are termed “detonating explosives” or 
“high explosives.” Decomposition of an explosive by the detonation process proceeds 
rapidly and the mechanical effects are relatively independent of the ambient conditions, 
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but are quite dependent on the density of the explosive. Detonation velocities are greater 
than the speed of sound and the pressure rise far exceeds the infinitesimal pressure rise 
associated with a sound wave. Because the detonation velocity is supersonic, there 
effectively is no forewarning to those persons or objects to be damaged by the shock 
wave. 
A second mechanism for the propagation of an explosive reaction throughout an 
explosive is thermal. In this case, material surrounding an initial exploding site is 
warmed above its decomposition temperature so that it explodes. Propellants exhibit this 
explosion mechanism, and are known as “deflagrating explosives” or “low explosives.” 
Transfer of energy by this thermal mechanism is a relatively slow process and is 
dependent on external conditions such as the ambient temperature. Deflagration speeds 
are always subsonic. 
Detonating explosives can break a target into small fragments long before the 
target can be pushed or moved away. Such an explosive like TNT can be characterized 
by the ability to shatter and can be said to have high brisance. An unconfined explosive 
detonated in an open area with plenty of space to expand can still shatter an object placed 
along side it because of brisance. In contrast, a deflagrating material exhibits only minor 
brisance effect since there is enough time for the heat to be dissipated into the open 
surroundings. For military uses, a relatively dense high explosive with high brisance is 
desired for localized attack on hard targets such as armor plate. For soft targets, such as 
flimsy structures or area effects, brisance is not pertinent and explosive yield is the 
parameter of importance. An airplane is designed to be as light as possible and 
consequently relatively weak, so even a deflagrating explosion may cause catastrophic 
results. 
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The single most important property of an explosive affecting the ability to cause 
damage is the amount of energy released. The energy can be expressed directly in 
conventional energy units such as Joules or foot-pounds, but a relative measure may be 
more practical. The practical relative values are known as explosive yields. A generally 
accepted standard for energy release is that in the explosion of TNT, (symmetrical 2,4,6- 
trinitrotoluene)6, an explosive chosen because chemically pure material is relatively 
available for calibration purposes. TNT is relatively safe to handle and for specimens of 
known density and crystalline nature, it gives quite reproducible explosion effects. 
Measurements of the energy in the blast wave has determined that TNT generates about 
4680 j oules per gram. However, these measurements, especially under field conditions 
are subject to uncertainties due to variability in measurement techniques and exact 
composition of the explosive sample. Therefore, a “standard” gram of TNT is defined as 
the blast energy of 46 10 Joules. In thennochemical units, this is 1 100 calories7. 
6 Symmetrical 2,4,6 trinitrotoluene means that the molecule consists of a benzene ring 
with methyl radical, CH3, attached to one of the 6 inner ring carbons making it toluene. 
Attaching a hydrogen to each of the ring carbons is the configuration for benzene. The 
hydrogen attached to three of the ring carbons are replaced with nitro-radicals, NOz, in 
positions 2,4 and 6 creating a symmetric arrangement of nitro-radicals. Positions 1 has 
methyl and position 3 and 5 have hydrogen attachments. 
7 By definition 4.184 joules equals 1 calorie, which is the energy necessary to raise the 
temperature of one gram of water one degree centigrade (Celsius). This thermochemical 
calorie with lower case “cYy is one one-thousandth of the Calorie associated with 
nutritional energy. The Calorie used in diets is usually designated with a capital case 
“C,. 
These definitions date to the earlier days of nuclear weapons when a standard ton of 
TNT was defined as the energy release of one million kilocalories or one billion calories. 
Today the convention is to associate such large energies with 4.61 million kilojoules per 
tonne of TNT. The tonne is the metric ton or one thousand kilograms or about 2204 
pounds avoirdupois, the common English pound. It is very close to 2200 pounds which 
is called a long ton. When we look into details, an answer to a simple question such as 
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Explosive strength of a chemical explosive is the magnitude of its explosion 
relative to that from the same quantity of reference TNT. For example, pentaerthritol 
tetranitrate, PETN, gives blast waves with about 150 % of the energy from the same mass 
of TNT. Hence, PETN is said to have 150 % the explosive strength of TNT. 
EXPLOSIVE DAMAGE 
An explosion does not give its target any advance warning since the blast wave 
travels faster than the speed of sound. The first manifestation is a forceful blow from the 
instantaneous pressure jump in its shock front. Almost immediately thereafter, there is 
the crushing effect of blast overpressure (pressure above atmospheric pressure, 14.7 
lb/in2), and a wind with velocity exceeding that found in the strongest hurricane. The 
blast wave effects decrease quasi-exponentially with time until atmospheric pressure is 
achieved (zero overpressure). The pressure decrease overshoots and there is a slight 
negative phase with a reversed blast wind. Finally, the blast wave subsides and 
atmospheric pressure returns. By this time, the damage has been done. 
Distance offers assured protection against damage from explosives. As a general 
guide, the protection afforded by distance is more desirable in practice than that provided 
by protective barriers since they are more predictable. With barriers such as walls, 
unanticipated effects can occur, such as the case where reflected shock waves from two 
barriers might at some points reinforce each other or be channeled to a particular point 
“what’s a ton?” requires some explaining. No wonder scientists and engineers always 
. seem to be arguing. 
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and cause greater damage than might be anticipated. Guidelines as to how far away 
parking is allowed are the outcome of the quantity-distance standards, which have 
evolved from past experiences. The quantity-distance standards are somewhat arbitrary 
rules which have been set by the Department of Defense [DoD Ammunition and 
Explosive Safety Stanhrds, published by the Superintendent of Documents, U. S .  
Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., Stock Number 008-007-02900-2 and 
newer revisions. A useful table may be found in Table 11 of Explosive Shocks in Air, 
Gilbert F. Kinney and Kenneth J. Graham]. 
The standards prescribed for safety distances are not simply the result of 
theoretical calculations, but have included empirical evidence from experiments and 
actual explosive accidents. On July 10, 1926, at Picatinny Arsenal, about three and a half 
miles from Dover, N.J., there occurred a series of explosions on the Lake Denmark 
Ammunition Depot of the United States Navy. This depot contained 160 buildings on 
461 acres partly overgrown with trees and brush. 44 of the buildings were for storage of 
high explosives, smokeless powder, projectiles, and black powder. At about 5: 15 p.m., 
lightning struck and black smoke was observed issuing forth from one of the magazines. 
There were immediate efforts to quell the fire with streams of water when, five minutes 
later, a tremendous detonation occurred. Five minutes later another explosions followed 
in another store house about 150 feet from the first detonation. A third series of 
explosions followed. The total amount of explosives in the three explosions was more 
than 670,000 + 1,600,000 + 180,000 pounds and estimated to be the equivalent of more 
than one thousand tons TNT. 
On April 16, 1947, the ammonium nitrate cargo on the SS Grandcamp, a 7,176 
gross ton Liberty ship owned by the French government detonated at a pier in Texas City, 
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Galveston County, Texas. In this accident, approximately 600 persons died and 3000 
were injured. Sixteen hours later, the ammonium nitrate cargo on the SS High Flyer, a 
6214 gross ton Liberty ship owned by Lykes Bros. Steamship Company detonated at 
another pier. The second explosion materially increased the property damage caused by 
the first explosion and injured another 50 to 100 persons, but only one person is believed 
to have been killed. 
The explosion disintegrated the S S  Grandcamp and threw its cargo of bagged 
shelled peanuts, bagged ammonium nitrate, tobacco, sisal binding twine, bunker oil, and 
other substance about 2000 to 3000 feet into the air. It floated the Longhorn 11, a steel 
barge with eleven foot draft, over the top of a freight car stop at the end of the spur and 
up on the shore without damaging the barge. 
The second explosion hurled a two thousand-pound turbine from the deck of the 
SS High Flyer about 4000 feet into the cooling tower of the refinery of the Republic Oil 
Refining Company. 
. A stack of several tons of unburned ammonium nitrate was found in the debris 
about 150 feet from the berth of the SS Grandcamp four days after its explosion. The 
ammonium nitrate was found undamaged still in paper bags, but on the next day, burning 
timbers in the rubble ignited the ammonium nitrate recreating some additional 
excitement. 
These and other events illustrate very clearly that large standoff distances are 
required to protect against explosive effects. Unanticipated secondary events can cause 
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additional damage. Although we speak colloquially of “safe” distances, the concept of 
“safe” is a definition, which may be a statutory limit with some degree of arbitrariness. 
For a mass of explosives between 0 and 20 kg (0 to 44 lb.), a safety distance of 21 
meters (70 feet) from inhabited buildings and 13 meters (43 feet) for public trf i ic ways 
is specified for chemical explosives storage. For storage of fragmentation munitions, the 
distances are increased to 380 and 230 meters (1250 and 760 ft) respectively. The 
distances do not scale directly with amount of explosives. Increasing the amount of 
explosives by a factor of five to between 100 and 120 kg (220 to 265 lb.) the distances 
are 56 and 33 meters (185 and 110 fi.) respectively for inhabited buildings and public 
traffic ways for the storage of chemical explosives. However, for the storage of 
fragmentation munitions, the safe distances remain 380 and 230 meters. 
The large standoff distances sometimes specified by various law enforcement 
agencies have their origin from these Department of Defense standards concerning the 
storage of munitions. 
SCALING 
The characteristics of a blast wave generated by an explosive depend on the 
explosive energy release and the nature of the medium through which the blast 
propagates. For consideration in airline and airport security, the medium for most cases 
can be assumed to be air and the characterization can be fairly simple. Scaling laws 
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allow us to take known results from one explosive yield and apply them to calculate the 
results to an explosive yield, which is pertinent to a particular situation. 
The scaling law for explosion is bas ed on fundamentals of geometrical similarity 
and is identical, in principle, with scaling laws used in other engineering applications, 
such as naval and aircraft engineering. By translating data obtained for models in water 
or wind tunnels, performance can be predicted for full-scale ships, airplanes, or missiles. 
Similarly, effects for explosives can be predicted. Basically, the energy released is a 
given amount and that energy must be extended into a particular volume. The blast wave 
must conserve momentum, but that momentum must be applied over the area covering 
the volume under consideration. 
Two explosions can be expected to give identical blast waves at distances, which 
are proportional to the cube root of the respective explosive energy release. This applies 
because the explosive energy is contained in a volume, which is proportional to third 
power of the distance from the source. This simply means that the volume is equal to 
4n/3.?, as we learned in solid geometry. For example, an eight kilogram TNT yield 
would have the same blast wave effect at 20 feet as an one kilogram TNT yield would 
have at 20 feet. The cube root of eight is two, so the distance is in the ratio of two to one. 
If the yields are known for cases 1 and 2 and the same effect as D1 from explosive 
1 would be found for explosive 2 at a distance D2 if 
D2 = Dl(Y2Rl)l”. 
Similarly, to get the same effect, the yield must be increased as the cube of the ratio of 
the respective distances. 
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where the subscripts 1 and 2 refer to the two explosives yields, Y. and their respective 
distances, D. The exponent 3 tells us to take the cube of the ratio of distances. An 
example in the use of this formula is to consider 1 kilogram of TNT (Y1) at a distance of 
20 feet PI). To observe the same effect at a distance of 80 feet @2), then the first charge 
must be replaced with 64 kilograms of TNT (Y2) at the original charge’s location. 
Other scaling laws for blasts effects have been well characterized and formulas for 
scaling of overpressure (the pressure jump associated with the shock wave), time of 
arrival of shock waves, impulse (the integrated product of the force over the duration of 
the pressure pulse), and blast wind velocity can be calculated. Almost all effects scale as 
the one-third power of the explosive yield, although temperature change due to the 
explosive effect must be taken into account. When dealing with explosions in the air, the 
effects must also take into account the changes in density, temperature and pressure due 
to the altitude. The obvious limit in taking into account altitude effect is to recognize that 
when the atmosphere is rarefied, there are almost no shock effects because there is no 
medium through which the shock wave can propagate. These effects require more 
sophistication than a simple geometric scaling law because the altitude effects consider 
more than distances. For example, at 30,000 to 35,000 feet altitude, the atmosphere is 
roughly one third as dense as at ground level. Between 55,000 and 60,000 feet, there is 
only one tenth as much atmospheric density as on the ground. Atmospheric density does 
not decrease linearly with altitude. 
However, the situation becomes more complicated in reconstructing the damage 
effects due to an explosion within an airplane at a high altitude because the pressure 
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within the passenger cabin may be different from the pressure within the cargo hold, 
which may be considerably different from outside atmospheric pressure. 
DYNAMIC LOADS 
The blast wave generated in an explosion imposes a dynamic load on any object 
in its path. This dynamic load is characterized by a rapidly reaching peak load, which 
then decreases as the blast wave decays. The net effect of the load depends both on the 
nature of the blast wave and the geometry and construction of the object. 
That geometry plays an important role can be appreciated by considering a blast 
wave impinging upon a pointed object head on and from the side. In the first case, there 
may be less damage because the shock can easily go around the object, whereas in the 
second case, the full force of the wave is borne broadside by the object. 
Blast waves from an explosion damage a structure by causing it to deform. 
Where the structure is unable to yield, the structure can be broken. If the structure yields, 
it may be deformed, or sometimes be sufficiently elastic that it can return to its original 
shape. Ductile materials may not necessarily fracture even when the deformation is 
plastic and result in permanent damage. This property can be characterized by the 
ductility ratio, which is defined as the ratio of the total elastic plus plastic deformation 
that an item can withstand without complete failure to its limiting or maximum elastic 
deformation. 
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Among the more complex, and in many respects, the more puzzling characteristic 
of an explosive shock front is its behavior when the shock front is reflected. Reflections 
can be normal reflection, which occurs when the shock impinges head-on onto its 
unyielding surface with the plane of the shock front parallel to that of the surface; oblique 
reflection where a shock impinges with a small angle between the plane of the shock and 
plane of the reflecting surface; and Mach stem formation where the shock front impinges 
on a surface near grazing incidence. Unexpected results can occur because the primary 
shock front can be reinforced by the reflected front. The effects on pressure, temperature 
and speed under these conditions need not necessarily be the algebraic sum of the 
individual primary and reflected shock fronts, but could exceed that resulting from the 
simple addition of the two. 
CRATER FORMATION 
When an explosion occurs above, at or below the ground surface, a crater can be 
formed. The mechanism of crater formation depends on the height or depth of the 
explosive blast. From the dimension and characteristics of the crater, the amount of yield 
can be reconstructed, but this requires knowledge of the ground material. There are 
different effects in hard granite and sandy soil, so immediate estimates of the yield of the 
explosion may have to be modified after careful consideration of target material 
characterization. In general, a crater is formed, but ejecta from the crater may ball back 
and also create a raised lip around the original crater. Consequently, the apparent crater 
boundary need not be the same as the true crater boundary, Depending on the 
* 
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temperatures achieved, the affected material may be ruptured and may even be partly 
melted to form a plastic zone. 
GENEWL CONSIDERATIONS 
The effects of an explosion are complicated, but the physics has been solved to 
present an engineering problem. There are many parameters to consider, so an accurate 
characterization may not always necessarily be possible. However, as a general 
consideration, the best defense against an explosion is to be far away from it. In most 
cases, if the amount of explosives is relatively small, the greatest physical danger to 
personnel comes from fragments and from loss of structural support. If the yield is large, 
than shock wave effects become important even very far from the source of the 
explosion. In areas in which flammables or explosives are stored, the danger of 
sympathetic explosions dictates safe standoff distances. Judgment needs to be exercised 
between an ideal explosive safety consideration solution and reasonable trade-off 
including traffic flow and personnel safety. Assumptions as to how large a standoff 
distance is required for a given explosive yield to protect an airport terminal require 
assumptions, which may not be immediately obvious. Those who create statutory 
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EXPLOSIVE AND DETECTION CHARACTERISTICS 
The detection of explosives for airline security requires non-invasive examination 
of containers, which may range from handbags to hold luggage to cargo containers. The 
expectation of finding explosives is quite small, perhaps no greater than one in a billion 
pieces of luggage. The economics of air transport, measured in terms of costs and in 
terms of passenger inconvenience requires a throughput rate that does not spend much 
time interrogating containers with no suspected contraband. The inspection system will 
have fulfilled its purpose with its deterrence effect in addition to its capability to find 
explosives. There is no single universal solution to the problem of finding hidden 
explosives, so at this time, we seek a system comprised of a gauntlet of barriers whose 
sum will deter those determined to introduce explosives into the air transport system. 
Although the probability of a piece of baggage containing explosives is extremely small, 
should that small probability event occur, the consequence is considerable. The task is 
not simple. 
A general set of criteria for a system integrating explosive detection devices 
(EDDs) must fulfill several qualitative criteria. The explosive detection system (EDS) 
must have a probability of detection of close to 100 % for bulk explosives. The 
probability of false positive alarmss should be commensurate with the ease of verifying 
the cause of the alarm, i.e. if the passenger is present with their luggage, a much larger 
false positive alarm rate can be tolerated than if the passenger is absent. The testing must 
be as close to automated as practical and should have as little reliance on human 
. 
8 A false positive is a miss-identification of an object as an explosive when it is not. A 
false negative arises when an explosive is not identified and is permitted to pass through 
the inspection barrier. False positives can be tolerated with the expense of consuming 
time for further inspection and verification. False negatives cannot be tolerated, since 
that would introduce the explosive beyond the inspection barrier. 
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judgment as possible. Finally, the system must not be susceptible to thwarting and 
should be difficult to circumvent. This last criterion requires recognition that the system 
must be able to find the explosive when hidden, camouflaged, or even when the intruder 
understands the detection system. An assumption that the threat is only from external 
passengers and that we are not susceptible to threats from inside operatives is extremely 
dangerous. 
As previously noted, each explosive has a distinct chemical composition, so that 
detection becomes a challenge in chemical identification. The first recognition is that the 
principal components of most common explosives are CHNO, carbon, hydrogen, 
nitrogen and oxygen. These are also the components of many common organic and 
inorganic material s9. 
As a class, explosives are rich in nitrogen and oxygen, but relatively poor in 
carbon and hydrogen. Individual atomic concentrations10 are not a particularly good 
discriminant for explosives since many high atomic concentrations of oxygen are found 
in many materials, for example as water, sand, dacron, silk and cotton. Very few items 
have high densities of nitrogen, the most common exceptions being certain plastics such 
as melaminel’, polyurethene and solid nitrogen. If a single element is to be used as an 
indicator of explosives, it would be nitrogen. Once the presence of nitrogen is 
9 In chemistry, organic refers to the presence of carbon which is associated as 
constituents of living organisms. Inorganic chemistry refers to chemistry not associated 
with carbon compounnds. 
10 Here, by atomic concentration, we mean that a material is composed with a significant 
percentage of the atoms of oxygen or of nitrogen. 
11 Melamine is most commonly associated with dishes used for everyday use in homes. 
Melamine dishes are rarely used as “good china” among middle class Americans, but are 
the dishes used by the “kids” when there is no company. 
’ 
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discovered, then more carehl discrimination would be made to eliminate the exceptions. 
Recall that an explosive contains its own oxidizer, consequently, in addition to the use of 
nitrogen as a discriminant, a high concentration of oxygen would also be an important 
indicator. 
Although explosives can have a wide range of densities, robust explosives such as 
TNT, Semtex, PETN and C-4 tend to have similar densities between 1.5 and 1.9 grams. 
Roughly, this is one and a half to twice the density of water, a quarter to a third the 
density of steel, and approximately the density of aluminum. If a non-metallic object 
“feels” in weight similar to aluminum, it may be worth further inspection. 
Most explosives are not amorphous, but have specific crystalline structure. In 
principle, the unique crystalline structure can be used to distinguish explosives from other 
light materials, which tend not to be crystalline and from metals, which are crystalline, 
but have different signatures. The technique used to observe crystalline structure is 
called x-ray Bragg scattering. 
In principle, the ideal way to determine if a piece of luggage contains explosives 
or not is to do a chemical analysis. Thermal neutron analysis, ion mass spectrometry, and 
gas chromatography are all methods to do chemistry. Sometimes the chemistry is done 
using nuclear techniques, such as in thermal neutron analysis, but basically, the technique 
is to identify the chemical constituents of the object being inspected. 
The ubiquitous airport x-ray machine does not try to determine luggage content 
by chemistry, but rather they try image hidden objects by looking at differences in 
density 
objects 
between one object 
such as metals, and 
and another. X-ray machines are useful in finding dense 
from the inferred shape, determining whether firearms are 
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being carried. However, they do not give unique signals for most light materials such as 
paper, clothing and most explosives. In fact, sugar can be used to simulate the military 
explosive C-4 since their x-ray interaction properties are almost identical. ’ 
An exception to the general statement that x-rays are not useful in detecting light 
materials is the case where the x-rays being observed are not seen transmitted through the 
object, but are seen reflected by the object under interrogation. Backscattered x-rays can 
be useful for detecting lighter elements. 
No single macroscopic attribute of explosive is a unique signature of explosives, 
but correlation between these properties can prove to be quite usefbl indicators of 
explosives. Explosives not only have high nitrogen concentrations, but a measurement of 
nitrogen and oxygen concentration in moles per cubic centimeter12 show that their ratio 
falls within a relatively tight range. No non-explosives and innocuous materials are 
contained in this range, with low concentrations of either the oxygen or of the nitrogen. 
Non-explosives tend to not have both high oxygen and nitrogen concentrations 
simultaneously. 
12 Moles per cubic centimeter is a measure of the number of molecules (or atoms) of in a 
given volume. No matter what the element, a gram atomic weight of an element, i.e. a 
number of grams equal to its atomic number, for example 16 grams of oxygen and 14 
grams of nitrogen, contains the same number of atoms which is equal to No = 6.02 x 
the Avaogadro’s number. (Amadeo Avogadro, 1776 - 1856, Italian physicist who 
hypothesized that equal volumes of gases, whether elements, compounds or mixtures, 
ehen they are at the same pressure and temperature, contain the same number of 
molecules. He did no prove this assertion, but his hypothesis proved to be correct. This 
concept has been extended to include solids as well, with the definition of a mole.) 
Technically speaking, a mole has two equivalent definitions. It is the amount of a 
compound equal in grams to its molecular weight, or it is Avogadro;s number of 
molecules of the compound. We have for our purposes extended this to apply to atoms in 
our discussion. Our discussion is a bit sloppy from a purist’s perspective, but is 
operati onally useful. 
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Carbon and hydrogen concentration ratios are relatively unique for explosives 
with a few common items, such as cellulose and saran wrap, having similar ratios. The 
measurement of this ratio requires accuracy's which are not easily attainable outside of an 
analytical chemistry laboratory. Even in the laboratory, the techniques, especially for the 
measurement of hydrogen, are difficult and generally destructive. (This points out 
another requirement for airport security inspections which is often not explicitly stated: 
Whatever detection techniques are used, they must be non-destructive, otherwise we'd 
have a lot of unhappy passengers.) 
Oxygen and carbon concentrations tend to be fairly unique to explosives. In our 
previous discussion of explosive efficiency, we wanted all carbon to be fully oxidized 
and ideally an oxygen balance of 0 %. The oxygen to carbon ratio is effectively a 
measure of the oxygen balance. 
The ability of the material to attenuate x-rays (mean ng that it blocks transmission 
of x-rays) versus the material density when correlated at different x-ray energies can be 
exploited to determine explosives as a group is fairly usehl. This correlation is exploited 
in so-called dual energy x-ray machines. 
All in all, explosive detection tries to identify material constituents with one form 
of chemical identification or other, even though the techniques may be classified as 
nuclear, or else with interaction involving electro-magnetic radiation. Most commonly x- 
rays are the electro-magnetic radiation exploited, but microwaves and radio-frequency 
waves have also been applied. An obvious, but commonly not thought of as being 
technical, method of interrogation is simple observation. This is interaction with the 
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optical spectrum of electromagnetic radiation since the human eye is sensitive to the 
visual part of the electromagnetic spectrum. 13 
TAGGANTS 
After the bomb explosion on board Pan Am Flight 103, some authorities 
suggested adding a variety of identification taggants, additives that can provide 
information before and after a blast, about the nature and source of an explosive. A 1998 
National Research Council (NRC) study concluded that economic and social constraints 
make their implementation at this time nearly impossible. Without making judgments on 
the desirability or feasibility of the use of taggants in explosives, a description of what 
they constitute will now be given. 
13 Prior to the mid 19* century, electricity and magnetism were thought to be unrelated to 
each other. The Scottish physicist, James Clerk Maxwell, 1831 -1879, based on the 
observations of the many past and contemporary scientists, was able to integrate them 
into a set of equation’s known today as Maxwell’s Equations. Visible, infrared and 
ultraviolet radiation were found to be the same basic phenomena. Today we know that 
this set of equations explained a range of phenomena known as the electromagnetic 
spectrum. The electromagnetic spectrum are described with characteristic frequency and 
wavelengths whose product is the speed of light. In our ordinary experiences, we 
encounter long wavelength radio waves with wavelengths of kilometers to x-rays whose 
wavelengths are a billionth of a millimeter. The same laws of physics apply to all 
electromagnetic waves. The visible portion of the spectrum centered between the 
infrared and ultraviolet electromagnetic waves, occupies a very an extremely small 
portion of the electromagnetic spectrum. In the visible portion of the spectrum, different 
colors are manifestations of different wavelengths ranging from red, orange, yellow, 
green, blue and violet in descending order of wavelengths. 
38 
Pre-detonation Taggants 
Plastic and sheet explosives are usually manufactured with very low vapor 
pressure, RDX14 or PET"5, as the primary energetic ingredient. They are difficult to 
detect with vapor detectors, including with the use of explosive sniffing dogs. 
Accordingly, the Ad Hoc Group of Specialists on the Detection of Explosives, who report 
to the United Nations Council of the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), 
proposed that volatile marker chemicals be added to plastic and sheet explosives during 
manufacture. Four detection markers have been identified, with one of these, DMNB16 
identified as a viable detection marker to be added in low concentration to plastic and 
sheet explosives. The addition of detection markers at this time has been recommended 
only to the extent required by the International Civil Aviation Organization Convention 
primarily because of economic considerations. Annually, more than five billion pounds 
of commercial explosives costing between $0.10 to $ 0.15 per pound are used annually 
just within the United States alone. An estimated lower limit cost for marking with 
DMNB is projected to be of the order of $0.02 and $0.20 per pound for a marking at the 
0.1 to 1 percent level. This relatively high cost limits its implementation except for the 
highest value commercial explosives. 
Other pre-detonation markers proposed include the substitution of carbon, 
hydrogen, oxygen or nitrogen components at some minute level with a radioactive 
14 RDX is the high explosive 1,3,5-trinitro-1,3,5-triazacyclohexane. 
15 PETN is the high explosive pentaerythritol tetranitrate. 
16 DMNB is 2,3-Dimethyl-2,3-dinitrobutane. Its use is in full accord with the ICAO 
Convention, ratified by the United States in April 1997, which requires detection 
marking of plastic sheet explosives. 
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isotope. l7 Beyond the marking of the explosives directly, other low-vapor-pressure 
components of the explosive device such as commercial booster, detonating cords, and 
detonating caps have the potential for marking. ANF0l8, which was used in the 
destruction of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma in 1995, requires a 
detonating device. Perhaps the tagging of the auxiliary detonator could make the 
identification of hard-to-detect explosives and explosive mixtures feasible. 
As the 1998 NRC report notes the desirability of the use of taggants must be 
weighed against the improvements in capabilities for detecting unmarked explosives. 
Post-blast Identification Taggants 
Identification of the source and date of manufacture of the explosive may be a 
usehl post-blast tool for forensic purposes. Various concepts have been proposed, 
broadly classed as particulate, isotopic or biological. Currently, only one taggant, 
currently manufactured by Microtrace Inc. has been subject to extensive testing in the 
Unites States and was the subject of a 1980 Congressional Office of Technology 
17 Isotopes are the same chemical elements except with the number of neutrons 
different. If the nucleus is inherently unstable it will suffer radioactive decay. Any 
substitution of the main elements of CHON in an explosive must be with a relatively long 
half half-life isotope. Of the explosive component elements, only tritium, a 12.3 year 
half-live isotope of hydrogen and carbon-14, a 5730 year half-life radioactive isotope of 
the stable carbon nucleus are candidates. There is the theoretical possibility that elements 
other than carbon, hydrogen, oxygen or nitrogen might be introduced as radioactive 
markers, but operational feasibility studies have not been conducted. The advantage of 
measuring radioactivity is that extremely small amounts can lead to detectable signatures. 
However, dealing with radioactivity introduces other complications such as additional 
storage and manufacturing requirements, which may not be easily addressed. 
18 ANFO is ammonium nitrate fuel oil mixture. Ammonium nitrate which is commonly 
used as a fertilizer is by itself not an explosive. However, as a slurry mixed with fuel oil 
(diesel oil), the combination is a powerful explosive. 
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Assessment report. The Microtrace taggant is essentially a very small chip composed of 
multi-colored layers. The combination of possible colored layer orderings effectively act 
as bar codes in which information about manufacturer, batch number, manufacture date 
and other pertinent descriptive attributes can be embedded. With a relatively small 
number of colors a large amount of information can be stored. For example, with five 
different colors, 60 combinations are possible; with six colors, 360, and with seven 
colors, 2520. Following this ordering, allowing for multiple layers, one can easily see 
that that the possible number of combinations is considerablelg. 
Needless to say, these taggants must be sufficiently robust to survive a blast. 
Taggants are used in Switzerland with microscopic color coded plastic chips. However, 
the application situation in Switzerland is considerably different from that in the United 
States. The Swiss explosives market is some seven-hundred-fold smaller than in the 
United States. In the United States, explosives are used in virtually all mining operations, 
whereas no comparable mining is done in Switzerland. 
19 The number of combinations possible is the number of colors factorial divided by 2, 
written as N!/2, where N is the number of colors, and the symbol "!" is the factorial 
which is a mathematical operation in which one multiplies the number N by each of the 
numbers N-1, N-2, down to N-(N-1) = 1 .  For example 3! = 3.2.1 = 6; and 7! = 
7.6@5*4*3*2.1 = 5040. The division by 2 accounts for the possibility that one cannot 
distinguish between the ordering of the colors being right side up and up side down. 
Using the example of red, blue and yellow; the orderings which are possible are red- 
blue-yellow; red-yellow-blue, blue-red-yellow; blue-yellow-red; yellow-blue-red; and 
yellow-red-blue. Noting that if we cannot distinguish between red-blue-yellow and 
yellow-blue-red, we have 3!/2 = 6/2 = 3 combinations possible. 
Many more combinations are possible if we are allowed to use the colors more than 
once, for example red-red-yellow-blue; yellow-red-blue-red; etc. Consequently, a 
relatively small number of colors sequentially embedded in a chip can store a tremendous 
amount of information. 
41 
ADDITIVES TO MAm EXPLOSIVES INERT 
Many common chemicals could potentially be used as explosives for bombs, but 
in practice, commercial and military explosives constitute the greatest threat for airline 
security. Sophisticated explosives used in nuclear weapons are intentionally made as 
inert as possible in order to prevent accidental detonation. Consequently, it may make 
sense to view the identification of detonators as a worthwhile activity. 
For terrorist activity on the ground, the most commonly accessible explosive 
material is ammonium nitrate. Ammonium nitrate is produced in enormous quantities for 
use both as fertilizer and as a legitimate blasting agent. Although considerable effort has 
been expended to find a way to reduce the effectiveness of ammonium nitrate as an 
explosive, currently no known technique or technology is known which would not affect 
its effects as a fertilizer. In principle, chemical suppressants or diluents could be 
introduced to render explosives inert, but they generally would only make them more 
difficult to detonate, much in the same way that fire retardants are added to textiles and 
polymers to make them less flammable. In Northern Ireland, limestone is added to 
ammonium nitrate in order to lessen their use for explosives. However, techniques for 
defeating attempts to inert explosives have always been found. 
EXOTIC EXPLOSIVES 
The emphasi s in explosive detection has been the detection of traditional military 
explosives, which are organic chemicals, usually, containing only four types of atoms: 
carbon, (C), hydrogen 0, oxygen (0), and nitrogen (N). To achieve maximum volume 
change, gas formation and heat release, explosives are designed to be dense, to have high 
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oxygen content, and to be maximally exothermic. Usually, explosives contain NO2 
which upon detonation transforms the nitrogen atoms into nitrogen gas (N2) while the 
oxygen combines with hydrogen and carbon to form gaseous water vapor (H20), carbon 
monoxide (CO) and carbon dioxide (C02). Explosions are different from combustion in 
that detonation reactions require that the source of oxygen be near at hand, in the same 
molecule, or in a neighboring molecule, as in the intimate mixture of ammonium nitrate 
and fbel oil (ANFO). 
Explosives are often classified by their stimuli and response. Propellants or 
deflagrating or low explosives are combustible materials containing the oxygen necessary 
for their combustion. Black and smokeless powder (colloided nitrocellulose) are low 
explosives. High explosives have a higher rate of reaction and produce high pressures 
rapidly. For example TNT creates a shock wave that travels at about 6000 meters per 
second, whereas gun powder detonation waves travel some 60 times slower. 
High explosives are characterized as primary and secondary explosives, 
differentiated by the way they are initiated. Primary explosives are detonated by simple 
ignition-spark, flame or impact. Secondary explosives require a detonator or primary 
explosive. They can be initiated by large shocks, which may be the result of the shock 
wave caused by a primary explosive. Lead axide, lead picrate, teracene, nitrogen 
sulphide (N4S4), copper acetylide, and nitrosoguanidine are examples of primary 
explosives. Nitrocellulose, nitroglycerine, dynamite, TNT, picric acid, liquid oxygen 
mixed with wood pulp, fbming nitric acid mixed with nitrobenzene, and compressed 
acetylene and cyanogen are examples of secondary explosives. 
Present explosive detection technology has concentrated on the detection of 
I 
military explosives, which fall under three general categories, all of which contain nitro, 
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NO2, groups. Nitrate esters, which contain 0-NO2 groups, include nitroglycerine, PET" 
(active component in DETA sheet), and nitrocellulose. These are generally the least 
stable military explosives and lose NO2 readily making them relatively susceptible to 
vapor detection. Nitroarenes contain C-NO2 and are typified by TNT (a component of 
Composition B) or picric acid. The third category contain nitroamines with N-NO2 
groups include RDX and HMX which are often the active component of plastic-bonded 
explosives such as Composition B, C-4, and Semtex. 
However, there are many energetic compounds and common explosives, which 
may not meet military demands, but could be used effectively as terrorist tools. Possible 
non-nitro-explosives can be found described in propellant, pyrotechnic and fuel/air 
explosive literature. Many are classified as composite explosives which are intimate 
mixtures of fuel and oxidizers. Peroxides can function both as oxidizers and as stand- 
alone explosives. Self-igniting systems such as boranes, phosphorus and alkali metals do 
not require blasting caps. Ammonium nitrate fuel oil ( N O )  is the most available class 
of explosive which does not contain the conventional NO2 nitro-group. 
Civilian nitrogen containing explosives include nitromethane, CE&N02, which is 
commonly used as an industrial solvent and as a he1 additive in hobby rockets and race 
cars. Although it might be classified as a conventional explosive, its melting point is 
-17" Centigrade and its boiling point is 101" C with a density only 15 %greater than 
water. Although it has a unique odor, bottled up, nitromethane could easily pass for 
water or wine and defeat present detection schemes. Picatinny Liquid Explosive (PLX), 
a slightly yellow liquid composed of 95 % nitromethane and 5 per cent ethylenediamene 
in a whisky bottle and 350 grams20 of Composition C4 in a radio were reportedly left by 
2o There are 454 grams in a pound. 350 grams is only 12 ounces, about a can of beer in 
volume. 
44 
two passengers who got off in-route in the November 1987 downing of Korean Air Flight 
858 in which 115 remaining passengers lost their lives. 
Ammonium nitrate, (AN, “03), is perhaps the most important raw material 
used as an industrial explosive. In 1986 over 11 billion pounds were produced in the 
United States with 80 % used as fertilizer and 20 % used in the explosive industry. It 
was patented as an explosive in 1867 by two Swedish chemists, who later sold the 
invention to Alfred Nobel who used AN in dynamite. During World War I, Amatol was 
developed as a mixture of AN and TNT. Ammonium nitrate by itself was not considered 
an explosive until 1921 in which a disaster occurred in Oppau, Germany, killing 600 
people. In 1947, two shiploads of AN detonated at Texas City, Texas. When 
combustible non-explosives are added to ammonium nitrate, they react with the excess 
oxygen to produce greater gas and heat creating higher pressures and temperatures. 
Rosin, sulfur, charcoal, sugar, oil and paraffin are suitable additions, although fuel oil is 
most often used. ANFO is a mixture containing 5-6 per cent fuel oil with the ammonium 
nitrate fertilizer. Since the middle of the twentieth century, ANFO has almost completely 
replaced dynamite in the mining industry. 
Mercury Fulminate, Hg(ONC)2, is a primary explosive, sensitive to heat, friction 
and light and easily decomposed. Until the development of lead azide, mercury 
fulminate was practically the only explosive used in detonators. Mercury is dissolved in 
concentrated nitric acid, ethanol is added and white crystals of mercury fulminate is 
formed and separated by washing. Several do-it-yourself explosive books provide 
detailed synthesis information. 
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Heavy metal azideszl, (Pb(N3)2, AgN3), explode with shock. These are described 
in terrorist handbooks as explosives, which can be readily created in the kitchen. We 
should be aware that sodium azide may soon become readily available as it is used in 
most automobile air bags with about half a pound found in many passenger-side air bags. 
In addition to non-conventional, nitrogen bearing explosives, there are a variety of 
nitrogen-free explosives among which include oxides of chlorine such as perchlorate 
which can react violently and produce toxic fumes; calcium hypochlorites, which can be 
obtained from swimming pool chlorine (HTH); and alkali2 metals which can 
spontaneously ignite on exposure to air or water. Some finely powdered non-alkali 
metals including lead, iron, nickel, cobalt and aluminum will also burst into flame in the 
presence of air. A syrupy mixture of powdered aluminum and carbon tetrachloride has 
been suggested as a sensitive explosive with the reaction: 
Al + CC4 - AlC13 
Thermite is used for welding in shipyards and for railroads a'nd can be applied to react 
explosively. The most common thermite reaction is: 
8 Al+ 3 Fe304 +. 4 A1203 + 9Fe  
This reaction generates a tremendous amount of heat and can create molten iron 
whose melting point is above 1530°C. This reaction welds by melting iron and allowing 
the molten metal to flow between metallic surfaces and create a bond. 
21 Azides are molecules containing a linear chain of three nitrogen atoms which contain 
considerable energy. They can be relatively stable against reaction with other molecules, 
but physical disturbances, such as a shock, can cause them to explode. 
2 Alkali metals including lithium, sodium and postassium are among the most reactive 
elements because they have a single unpaired electron in the valence shell. These are 
classified as members of group 1A in the periodic chart. 
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Peroxides including hydrogen peroxide, (H2OZ), in concentrated form can be a 
violent oxidizer in the presence of a fuel. In World War II, the United States Navy 
successhlly used it as a propellant for submarine torpedoes. Phosphorous, P4, self ignites 
in air above 34' C and must usually be stored in mineral oil or water. Finely divided 
phosphorous is combustible. Phosphorus can react exothermically with the oxygen in the 
air: 
P4 + 5 O2 4 P4010 
and can induce further reactions, which act explosively. 
There are many other materials and reactions which can be used to obtain 
explosive effects including acetylides, hydrides, potassium permanganate, etc. Present 
efforts in explosive detection have focussed on detection of conventional explosives. The 
possibility of introducing non-conventional explosives by terrorists is to alert the reader 
that vigilance is multidimensional and that complacency can lead to disastrous 
consequences. More advanced explosive detection technology may not currently be 
available, but other avenues such as profiling, intelligence gathering and analysis, sound 




DETECTORS AND TECHNOLOGY 
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DETECTORS AND TECHNOLOGY 
Technologies relevant to airline security incorporate a variety of fields. Direct 
detection of explosives and other weapons are the subject of research and development 
involving advanced hardware. Physical protection includes alarms, barriers and access 
control. Procedural means for interrogation require knowledge of human factors. Other 
approaches such as passenger profiling must be sensitive to human rights issues and 
stereotyping. Incident response may differ for each situation. Data dissemination relies 
not only on current networked information technology, but also includes interagency 
coordination as well as simple human communication among security personnel. 
Sometimes the threat device may be undetected, but other associated components such as 
detonator wiring may reveal the presence of a weapon. A single approach or concern 
may not detect anomalies, but a layering of security approaches can provide an integrated 
system which is capable of instilling confidence that airline security works. The 
emphasis is on an integrated system. 
Although the engineering details of llow devices work may be quite complicated, 
the essential physics of detection technologies is fairly easy to understand. This basic 
understanding is facilitated because the technologies are those we encounter in our 
everyday experiences. In this chapter, we will attempt to describe operational and 




Although, in general, metals are not an inherent component of explosives, metal 
detection is an important component of any airline security system. In the early days of 
the airline industry, the greatest threat from terrorism or other criminal activity was the 
threat of hijacking. Metal containing firearms and knives were the weapons used to 
threaten crews and passengers. Metal detection could eliminate a considerable threat 
hazard by not allowing the introduction of weapons on board airplanes. Even when 
bombs were introduced as hijacking weapons as in the case of D.B. Cooper, the 
triggering and initiation mechanism required wiring. Detonators and timers usually 
contain detectable amounts of metal. Consequently, metal detection is a first defense 
against explosive devices. 
Most metal detectors used at airports fimction either by detecting changes in 
induction caused by additional presence in the portal or by detecting eddy currents 
produced in metal within the portal by a radio frequency pulse. A drawback of inductive 
metal detectors is that they cannot detect nonmetallic objects such as plastic weapons or 
explosives. 
In the simplest electrical circuit, there is a voltage source, resistance, capacitance 
and inductance. The voltage source is a power source, which drives the metal detection 
device. The amount of current that flows through the detector is depends upon the 
resistance. For a given voltage, the more resistance there is, the less current flowsB. 
23 The relationship between voltage and resistance is given by Ohm’s law, V = IR where 
V is the voltage expressed in Volts, R is the resistance expressed in Ohms and I is the 
current expressed in Amperes. Since equivalently I = V/R, the lower the resistance, the 
greater the current for a given voltage. Short circuiting means that the resistance is 
lowered to nearly zero and the current approaches infinity. Since real circuits are not 
isolated, there will be some other part of the total circuit which will not be able to tolerate 
the large current. Hopefully, the weakest part of the total circuit is a fuse or a circuit 
50 
Capacitance is effectively caused by a gap in the circuit, in which a charge must build up 
on one side of the gap and an equal, but oppositely signed charge builds up on the other 
side. The simplest capacitor3 can be constructed with two separated flat metal plates 
with a voltage applied across them. Energy is stored in the capacitor in the form of 
electric fields. Inductance25 can be created by a wire looped into a coil. A current going 
through the coil creates a magnetic field, which stores energy within the coil. The 
presence of a foreign object within a coil is detected because the resistance, capacitance 
and/or inductance changes for the circuit. Mutual-inductance metal detectors are most 
susceptible to magnetic materials inserted within the interrogating coilx. 
breaker and these can be replaced or reset. Unfortunately, in many instances, there are 
other components which cannot withstand the large currents driven by a short circuit and 
the damage is not easily repaired. 
24 The relationship between capacitance and voltage is expressed as Q = CV where Q is 
the charge (of one sign) expressed in Coulombs stored on the plate, V is the voltage in 
Volts and C is the capacitance expressed in Farads. The capacitance depends on 
geometric factors such as the area of the metal plates and the gap distance between the 
two plates. It also depends upon the material filling the gap between the plates. The 
larger the plate and the smaller the gap distance, for a given voltage, the more charge that 
can be stored. Also more charge can be stored if the material between the plates is a 
good insulator. The capacitance is a measure of a .physical object to store charge 
(capacity for charge storage). 
25 The relationship between the current and voltage in an inductor is given by V = LI 
where V is the voltage across the inductor and I is the current flowing through the 
inductor. L is the Inductance expressed in units of Henry. For a simple coil of wire, L 
depends on the physical dimensions of the loop, the number of loop turns in the coil of 
wire and magnetic properties of the material within the coil. Transformers have soft 
ironm which is magnetic, wrapped with wire loops in order to increase the inductance. 
26 Strictly speaking, the description of L, the inductance is that for self-inductance. If 
there are two Ioops, the presence of one loop is noticed by the other loop. The effect is 
caused by the mutual inductance, which can be written in the simplest form as V(2) = 
M*I(l), where V(2) is the voltage across the second loop induced by a current 1(1) in the 
other loop. M is the mutual inductance which is related to the geometry and material 
composition of the loops. The effect works reciprocally and V(l) = M*I(2) with the 
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I If the current in one loop is time varying, such as a pulsed current, a voltage can 
be induced with a conductive material, which now effectively acts like the second current 
loop (eddy currents). Electromagnetic induction metal currents detect the presence of a 
conductive material by observing the effects of current induced in that material. 
All types of metal detectors are “electromagnetic” and share common features. A 
search head contains one or more coils carrying a time-varying electric current, which 
may be a pulse. The time varying current generates a time-varying magnetic field, which 
propagates outward. Depending on the design, the field may be made somewhat 
directional to interrogate a particular region in space. If there is a metal (meaning 
conductive) target, the primary field causes (induces) a current to be set up in the target. 
The current induced in the target generates a secondary magnetic field, which can be 
detected by receiver coils in the primary metal detector unit. 
A wide range of variations is possible for the metal detector. For example, the 
number of coils; the shape of the primary magnetic field; the time varying shape of the 
transmitted pulse including the frequency; and the configuration of the receiving coil can 
all be engineered differently to vary capabilities and cost of the metal detector. In some 
units, the same coil is used for transmitting and receiving. Pulses may be used so that the 
primary electromagnetic pulse does not interfere with the electromagnetic signature from 
the target. The head coils can be magnetic or air-cored. In situations where extremely 
weak return signals are expected, such as the case in the detection of buried landmines, 
the effects of the earth’s intrinsic magnetic field must be taken into account and 
compensated. 
same mutual inductance. The relative orientation and spacing of the two loops with 
respect to each other can change the value of the mutual inductance M. 
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For interrogation of personnel, such as at the airport passenger terminal, 
throughput is important, so the coils may be configured as portals through which the 
passenger passes. The amount of metal, which can be detected, can be varied by 
changing circuit parameters such as resistance, capacitance and inductance. The setting 
of sensitivity may be determined by regulatory agencies that in turn must make 
judgement as to what are likely threats to be encountered. Detection of electromagnetic 
signatures is very sensitive to the distance between the target and the probe, so hand held 
metal detectors can be used to isolate and determine the precise location of the metal 
object being interrogated. 
The induced current is not created instantaneously. If the primary (or transmitted) 
magnetic field is a pulse, the response current (eddy current) will mimic the time 
behavior of the primary. When the primary pulse ends, the response current does not 
immediately disappear, but will decay away gently since the energy source driving the 
eddy current has disappeared. Nevertheless, the decay persists for a little time, about a 
hundred microseconds or so. The persistence will depend predominately on the target’s 
electrical conductivity and size. Low conductivity alloys or thin foils have very short 
decay time. Ionic conductivity in sea- or brackish water is low, so in that environment 
the signal may decay away very rapidly and metal detection becomes impractical. 
These eddy currents generate a secondary magnetic field, which propagates in all 
directions, including back towards the search head, where it induces a small voltage in 
the coil. The received voltage from a target at the limit of the detection range may be 
only a few millionths of a volt (microvolts), perhaps one ten-millionth the voltage 
initially induced by the primary pulse (back-emf). The receiver ignores the signal during 
the transmit pulse and the immediate response (back-emf) time and only “looks at” the 
signal after a short delay. This insures that the transmitted and received signals are 
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separated from each other and the received signal is not swamped by the transmitted 
signal. 
If the target is both conductive and magnetic (ferrous) the return signature can be 
enhanced by the target’s magnetic properties. However, even with a non-magnetic 
conductor, eddy currents will be set up in the target and a return signal can be detected. 
If there is no target at all, nothing should happen. Actually, there will always be 
electrical “noise” associated with the receiver coil and circuitry and these must be made 
as close to zero as possible. In addition effects due to temperature and circuit warm-up 
and cool-down can make the receiver “drift” and these must be compensated. Looking 
inside a metal detector, the circuitry is complicated since human intervention would be 
too imprecise and slow. 
In order to reduce false alarms to an acceptable level, inspectors may require 
subjects to empty their pocket of metal objects. This slows inspection and precludes 
covert inspection, but their visibility acts as a deterrent for the introduction of metallic 
weapons. 
In the use of inductive metal detectors, it is important that its location be such that 
they avoid electromagnetic interference (EMI). E M  acts as a source of noise and may 
reduce the sensitivity of the detector. It is possible to increase the interrogating field, but 
because of concerns for the operation of cardiac pacemakers, the current standard for 
general public exposure= is 1 Gauss28. 
~~ ~~ 
27 This standard is set by NILECJ-Std-0601.00 issued by the National Institute of Law 
Enforcement and Criminal Justice (now the National Institute of Justice) in June 1974 
and by exposure guidelines set by the Bureau of Radiological Health (BRH) of the Food 
and Drug Administration (FDA). Some designers speculate that modern pacemakers are 
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Other methods for detecting metals include the measurement of reflection of 
radiofrequency29 electromagnetic waves. In this approach smaller metal objects 
including knives, firearms and other weapons could be detected at short distances by low- 
powered radar30 systems that can be used to “frisk” suspects electronically. Simple 
short-range radar systems can detect the presence of a metal object but generally would 
not distinguish weapons from innocuous objects such as watches and coins. 
less susceptible to such EM1 from metal detectors and a committee of the American 
Society of Testing and Materials (ASTM) has debated on proposals to increase the limit 
to 3 Gauss. However, this effort was abandoned because there was no disinterested third 
party such as the National Institute of Health willing to do the human experimentation 
required to prove safety at this level. 
28 A Gauss is a unit for the measurement of magnetic fields. The earth’s magnetic field 
within the United States is of the order of one-half Gauss and a refrigerator magnet 
provides about 100 Gauss on contact. The standard metric unit (SI = Systeme 
Internationale or MKS = meter-kilogram-second) of magnetic fields is the Tesla, T = 
10,000 Gauss. The Gauss was in common use with the cgs = centimeter-gram-second 
system of units which is still commonly used in some technical fields. 
29 Radiofrequency electromagnetic waves (RF) are electromagnetic waves ~ t h  
wavelengths in the range of centimeters and meters. For all electromagnetic waves, the 
product of the wavelength and the frequency is exactly equal to the speed of light. 
Originally the acronym RADAR stood for Radio Detection and Ranging. By sending 
a electromagnetic wave pulse out towards a target, the pulse reflected from a metal target 
could be detected revealing the presence of a metal target. Because all electromagnetic 
waves travel at the speed of light, careful measurement .of the time interval between when 
the pulse was sent out and when its reflected pulse was detected could reveal the range to 
target. The total distance traveled is half the distance traveled by the pulse since the 
pulse must make a round trip. R = (c* T)/2, where R = range to target, and T = roundtrip 
time for the pulse. c is the speed of light equal to 300 million meters per second (3 x 10’ 
d s )  .
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More expensive millimeter-wave radar systems have the resolution31 to create 
TV-like images of objects. Nonmetallic objects also reflect radio waves and can be 
detected and imaged by radioreflectometry. This is called dielectrometry and could, in 
principle, be used to “frisk” suspects electronically for object shaped like nonmetallic 
weapons or explosives. A near perfect conductor such as a metal will reflect back almost 
all the radiofrequency electromagnetic radiation impinging upon it. A perfect insulator 
will not reflect any of the RF wave. Most non-metals are somewhere in between a 
conductor and insulator and are characterized by a property called the dielectric constant. 
Some of the impinging RF wave will be transmitted and some will be reflected. By 
measuring the amplitude of the reflected wave, an estimate of the dielectric constant32 
may be made and the target material may be guessed. There are some efforts to develop 
dielectrometers not only for detection of concealed explosives and weapons, but also for 
detecting other contraband such as drugs. 
31 In general, the resolution, or the ability to distinguish to two separated points, is 
limited by the wavelength of the probe radiation. Millimeter wave electromagnetic 
radiation would have wavelengths and resolution to “see” objects with features with 
millimeter characteristic differences. 90 gigaHertz (90 billion cycles/second) waves 
would have a resolution of about 3 mm whereas 30 GHz waves would have a resolution 
of 1 centimeter. 
32 The dielectric constant (also called its relative permittivity) is determined by the 
response of the molecules to the presence of an electric field. The magnetic permeability 
is determined by the response of the material to the presence of a magnetic field. The 
square root of the product of the permittivity and the permeability is the index of 
refraction and determines how much an electromagnetic wave will bend going into the 
object. In addition, the speed of the electromagnetic wave a material is slower than in a 
vacuum. The speed of Iight in a material is the speed of light in a vacuum divided by the 
index of refraction. 
For most purposes, air may be treated as having an index of refraction of 1 .O and water 
has an index of refraction of 1.33. This means that the speed of light (electromagnetic 
waves) in water is one third slower in water than in air. The permeability and 
permittivity depend upon the frequency of the electromagnetic wave traversing through it 
and accounts for different properties for different types of electromagnetic waves. 
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There are trade-offs in the application of these technologies. In most prototypes, 
the expense of the detection system lies in the source, detector and the signal processing 
equipment. The detectors are usually a horizontal array of solid state chips3? which are 
mechanically scanned vertically. The collection of the imaging information takes time. 
Human exposure concerns must be addressed for differing wavelengths. As extreme 
cases, if 3 GHz were chosen, that frequency is that used in common kitchen microwave 
units and is specifically designed to excite water molecules34. 180 GHz with its shorter 
wavelength would provide better resolution. Detectors35 specific to these frequencies are 
being developed and show promise. A limitation of higher frequencies is the atmosphere, 
which absorbs RF radiation in a very short distance. 30 - 90 GHz RF is a compromise of 
resolution, availability of sources, availability of detectors and human safety 
considerations and the time necessary to detect and process the image information. In 
many of these systems, the engineering feat of assuring fast passenger throughput and 
preserving a sufficiently short and small exposure level is a non-trivial challenge. 
Metal detection is the first line of defense against the introduction of weapons. 
There are pistols, which are primarily plastic, and explosives themselves do not contain 
metals. However, the firing pin, the detonation cap and wiring are usually metal and 
most of the time an alert inspector can get sufficient information to interrogate and 
inspect a suspect person or object for closer scrutiny. The introduction of metal detectors 
at airports has detected mmerous weapons, knives, guns and even hand grenades. 
33 One detector for detection microwave radiation is composed of Gallium Arsenide tiles. 
Different detectors are capable of detecting different wavelengths (or frequencies), so a 
system designed for one frequency may not compatible detectors for another frequency. 
34 Should this frequency be applied, besides the lack of resolution, human safety would 
be a critical concern since the body is composed mostly of water. We do not want to 
"cook" the suspect even if he were trying to sneak a weapon on board. 
35 Shottky-banier diodes. 
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Airplane hijackings have been reduced substantially from the 1960’s and 1970’s prior to 
D.B. Cooper’s infamous hijacking exploit, which played an instrumental role in the 
public awareness of the need for passenger inspection. If one recognizes its limitations, 
metal detection is a critical component of the inspection system to insure airline security. 
DETECTION WITH X-RAYS 
The non-invasive examination of containers presents challenges whether we are 
examining handbags, hold luggage or cargo containers. Ideally, the inspector would have 
x-ray vision powers capable of visualizing the contents of the container. (X-rays 
penetrate into the object and substitute for “Superman” powers.) 
Sometime around December 1895, the German physicist, William Conrad 
Roentgen (1845 - 1923), discovered a mysterious and invisible form of radiation that 
streamed from the positively charged electrode of a vacuum tube. The vacuum tube was 
created by a talented glassblower and mechanic, Johann Geissler, in the middle part of 
the 19* century. These tubes were made possible by Geissler’s invention of the mercury 
pump, which allowed the manufacture of evacuated glass tubes with two electrodes 
sealed within them. Geissler’s tubes are the precursor of today’s TV sets and the cathode 
ray tube necessary for computer displays. Various metals, if included in the tube, would 
glow% in brilliant colors and the Geissler tube was a popular novelty. Roentgen played 
36 Fluorescence is the property of a substance to produce visible light while it is being 
acted upon by radiant energy, such as ultraviolet rays or x-rays. In many substances, the 
energy from the radioactivity excites atomic electrons and when they return to lower 
energy states, visible light is emitted. Consequently, although glowing and radioactivity 
do not necessarily go hand-in-hand, many radioactive substances can be seen to “glow.” 
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with these tubes and discovered that certain minerals could be caused to glow and the 
radiation could penetrate materials, which were opaque to light. 
The difference between Roentgen and rest of us grown up kids is that he was 
observant and curious. Roentgen was a scientist not known for neatness and just 
happened to have some fluorescent mineral lying around. Being a good scientist, he was 
able to recognize that a new phenomenon was being observed and systematically study it. 
The newly discovered radiation could expose photographic plates, which were wrapped 
in black paper. He called the new radiation “X rays” for “x”, the generally used symbol 
for unknown quantities in mathematics. William Conrad Roentgen was able to show that 
the radiation was different from the cathode rays within the t ~ b e 3 ~ .  The X-rays could 
penetrate wood and flesh but could be blocked by metal and bone. He was able to 
produce pictures of a set of weights in a small box and of the bones of his wife’s hand? 
They were the first X-ray photographs. For his work, Roentgen received the Nobel Prize 
in 1901. 
The medical community almost immediately recognized the utility of X-rays to 
visualize parts of the human body inaccessible to observation without intrusion. Material 
37 The positively charged terminal is called the anode and the negatively charged 
terminal is called the cathode. Now we know that cathode rays are negatively charged 
electrons and X-rays are electromagnetic radiation. Electromagnetic radiation can be 
described as particles and waves called photons with the product of the wavelength and 
frequency equal to the speed of light. X-rays have wavelengths which are about the 
diameter of atoms. Roentgen was able to show that cathode rays (electrons) would be 
deflected by a nearby magnet, whereas, X-rays would not be deflected by the magnetic 
field just as a beam of visible light would not be affected by the presence of a magnet. 
38 Physicists can tend to be resourceful. Using his wife’s hand with her wedding band, 
Roentgen did not have to rely upon hired help or graduate students for this historical 
recording. Being married to physicists in those days may not have been the safest thing 
because sometimes the spouse became part of the experiment. 
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science progressed because the X-ray provided a probe with wavelength and, 
consequently, resolution sufficiently small to see details of atomic and crystalline 
structure. The structure of the double helix of a strand of DNA, the molecule that carries 
genetic information could be seen with X-rays. The structural integrity of welds in ship 
hulls could be inspected with X-rays. And today, X-rays contribute towards insuring 
passenger safety from the introduction of firearms, explosives, drugs, flammable 
materials and other objects, which could endanger passenger safety. 
The basic X-ray interaction with materials is fairly straightforward, but 
complicated engineering refinements tremendously enhance their visualization capability. 
Basic X-rays whether found at the airport or the dentist's office, dual or multi-energy X- 
ray scanners, back scatter X-ray scanners, computer tomography (CT) X-ray scanners all 
require the understanding of the physics of the interactions of X-rays with matter. 
The ability of matter to block X-ray transmission through it is characterized by its 
attenuation coefficient. If an incident X-ray of intensity I, (photons/second) strikes a slab 
of material of thickness, t, the intensity on the other side of the slab is I, where the 
original intensity has been diminished by an exponential factor: 
I = I,exp(-pt), 
where p is a characteristic of the materid called the attenuation coefficient. If the 
thickness is expressed in centimeters, the attenuation coefficient39 is expressed in inverse 
~~ ~~ ~ 
39 There are other ways to express the attenuation Coefficient. As we have presented it 
here, p is the linear attenuation coefficient expressed 'in units of inverse centimeters. If 
we express the thickness of the slab in terms of the linear thickness times the material 
density, we call the attenuation the mass attenuation coefficient expressed in units of 1 / 
(gm/cm2 - cm2/gm). The reason to use the mass attenuation coefficient rather than the 
linear attenuation coefficient is that thickness, T, is essentially a measure of the number 
of atoms in the path of the X-ray. The mass attenuation coefficient allows for easy 
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centimeters, (1 / cm). The minus sign tells us that as the thickness increases, the intensity 
diminishes. The exponential function rapidly becomes smaller. For example, exp(-0) =l; 
exp(-0.5) = 0.61; exp(-1) = 0.37. The inverse of p, p-’ = Up, is called the attenuation 
length and tells us what amount of material would diminish the initial incident flux by a 
factor“ of “e” = 2.718. 
If there is one centimeter of water in the path of the X-ray, there are as many 
molecules as in 10 meters of steam. If the path length is expressed as the physical path 
length times the density of either water or steam, the thickness of water or steam can be 
expressed as a gram/cm2 of H20, for both states of matter. It is more convenient to 
express thickness in units which measures the amount of material and the convention of 
mass attenuation coefficient is used. The mass attenuation coefficient is the product of 
the density and the linear attenuation coefficient. Unfortunately, the same symbol, p, is 
conventionally used for both the mass and the linear attenuation coefficient. In both 
cases, p is a measure of the ability of the intervening material t‘o remove X-rays from the 
original intensity. 
The mass attenuation coefficient depends on the material and the energy of the X- 
ray traversing through it. Bones and metals have a mass attenuation coefficient greater 
than through skin and flesh. Consequently, for medical X-rays, most of the X-rays pass 
through the soft tissue and the bone appears dark because the X-rays have been removed 
from the primary path. 
comparisons of gases and solids where the physical densities differ by a factor of a 
thousand or so. 
40 e is the base of the natural system of logarithms and has a numerical value of 
approximately 2.7 1828.. . . 
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The ubiquitous airport X-ray machines can quite readily produce an image of 
dense materials, but cannot easily image lighter materials or lighter materials masked by 
the denser image. Unfortunately, the mass attenuation coefficient cannot give unique 
signals for explosives since most light materials (plastics, paper, clothing) have 
essentially the same absorption effects41 as explosives. Some discrimination between 
materials is possible because different materials absorb differently and shades of gray 
may be observed, In a sophisticated system, as many as 80 shades of gray are possible 
depending on the degree of absorption. These shades of gray may be displayed as 
different colors (pseudo-colors) to produce an artificially enhanced visual presentation. 
The simple x-ray machine cannot distinguish between a thin slab of metal and a thick 
slab of a less dense weaker absorber. Simple X-ray systems rely upon humans to 
interpret the observed pattern. Pattern recognition depends on many factors including 
training, experience and attention quality of the observer. Pseudo-color presentation can 
remove some of the subjective elements and less experienced operators may be able to 
discern patterns that might be hidden in a gray shade presentation. 
Dual and Multi-Energy Systems 
Dual-energy scanners are really two X-ray systems whose beams are generated 
from sources that have maximum intensities at different energies42. The attenuation 
41 The two most important effects for attenuating X-rays is absorption and scattering. 
With absorption, the X-ray energy is absorbed by the intervening material, whereas 
scattering redirects the X-ray into another direction. This scattered X-ray may appear in 
other directions and can have the effect of creating background or “fogging” of images 
taken elsewhere. 
42 X-rays peaked at specific energies can be obtained by judicious choice of anode 
materials. In an x-ray tube, the cathode is a source of electrons and the electrons are 
accelerated by a potential difference between the cathode and the anode. When the 
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coefficients are functions of the X-ray energy and can produce different gray scale 
presentations of same target. Generally, higher energy x-rays suffer less absorption than 
lower energy x-rays impinging on the same target. While areas of heavy elements are 
dark in both views, areas of light elements differ. The lower-energy x-ray image will be 
darker. Comparison of both images, light elements such as carbon, nitrogen and oxygen 
may be emphasized. The use of the dual energy system allows some discrimination 
among organic substances which are usually composed of lighter elements, inorganic 
substances usually containing heavy elements and opaque materials which contain a lot 
of heavy element matter. By false color imaging, the organic material might be presented 
as a bright colored object, indicating the need for closer scrutiny. Here operator skill is 
crucial for good discrimination and avoidance of false positive identification. 
If more than two x-ray energies are used, the system is classified as a multi- 
energy system. Usually the multi-energy x-rays are produced by a single x-ray tube that 
transmits a broad spectrum of energies. These systems cannot distinguish among light 
elements, but can be useful in overcoming the countermeasure of hiding explosives 
behind an object made of a heavy element. As a practical matter, if the entire beam is 
absorbed, then all that is seen is a dark blob. Almost a full centimeter of steel would be 
. required to fully absorb the x-ray beam. 
electron slams into the anode, interaction with the atomic nucleus slows down the 
electrons and a spectrum of X-rays are generated with energies up to that determined by 
the voltage difference between the cathode and anode. The process of slowing down the 
electrons produce x-rays. These x-rays are called bremsstrahlung from the German 
words bremsen meaning braking and strahlung meaning rays. X-rays produced in this 
manner are thus “braking radiation” coming from the braking of the cathode ray 
electrons . 
In addition, atomic electrons may be knocked out of their normal position in the target 
anode atom. When electrons “fall” back into these “stripped” atoms, energy is released 
in the form of x-rays. These x-rays have very specific energies. These x-rays are energy 
specific to the target atom and are called characteristic x-rays. 
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Backscatter X-Rays 
The x-ray attenuation coefficient contains two terms, one for absorption and 
another for scattering. The absorption phenomenon is primarily caused by the 
photoelectric effect43 which is the absorption of the x-ray energy by an atomic electron. 
The electron gains kinetic energy sufficient to free it from the atom. The probability for 
the photoelectric interaction increases with the atomic number, Z, which is the number of 
electrons in an atom. The scattering effect depends primarily on Compton scattering, 
which may be viewed as the scattering of a x-ray by an individual electron. The 
Compton scattering phenomenon is relatively independent of the atomic number. 
Therefore, the resulting backscatter signal favors low 2 elements, especially low 2 
elements of high density such as plastic explosives. 
43 In the 1880’s it was observed that electromagnetic radiation (light) striking metal 
caused electrons to be freed from the surface. The electromagnetic radiation, which for 
our purposes is x-rays, is absorbed by the atomic electron and sufficient energy is given 
to the electrons near the surface to free them from the metal. It took Albert Einstein 
(1879 - 1955) to properly explain the phenomenon in 1905 using Max Planck’s new 
quantum theory of radiation to explain the photoelectric effect. The phoelectric effect is 
the basis for the photographer’s light meter and for other light-sensing devices. 
Max Planck (1 858-1947) introduced the radical idea that light came in packets called 
photons. Later this concept could be extended to include the whole electromagnetic 
spectrum from radio waves to gamma rays. This was a radical departure from the 
concepts predominant at that time in which light was considered to be waves. Quantum 
Theory, or Quantum Wave Theory reconciled the seemingly incompatible concepts. 
Mathematics is a language which incorporates particle-wave duality, whereas the English 
language (and for that matter all other spoken languages) has difficulty expressing the 
vagaries of the atomic world. 
A closely related effect is the photovoltaic effect which converts electromagnetic 
radiation into a flow of electrons parallel to the surface of certain materials such as thin 
silicon crystals. Here the photons impart enough energy to free the electrons from the 
individual atoms, but the electrons do not leave the crystalline structure. The 
photovoltaic effect is the basis for solar cells. 
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By observing x-rays, which have been backscattered, rather than those which have 
been transmitted through a target, a direct measurement of elements with low atomic 
number can be imaged. A system with a large area detector on the same side as the x-ray 
source can also be combined with a detector on the other side. By combining the 
information from both sides it is possible to determine the locations of heavy element 
objects as well as of light element objects. In these systems, the source x-ray beam must 
be relatively narrowly focused into a pencil beam so as not to directly interfere with the 
detector. Rather than a single large area detector, a line detector can be scanned across 
the target body or alternatively, the detector can be fixed and the pencil x-ray beam may 
be swept across the target body. Operator experience is a definite asset to identifying 
weapons, explosives and contraband, but there are efforts to make the system more 
amenable for automatic detection. Advances in computation and computation algorithms 
give hope for using backscattered electron systems for an automatic detection system. 
In addition to their use for detection of contraband, firearms and explosives at 
airports, the backscattered x-ray systems have application for inspecting visitors to prison 
facilities and embassies where security is also of paramount concern. 
Computerized Tomography X-Ray Scanners 
If a series of detectors can see the transmitted x-ray from a variety of directions, 
the density of materials from several path directions can be reconstructed. As in 
conventional x-ray systems, the density of each location along the path of a beam can be 
determined an array of detectors placed on a rotating circumferential element around an 
object. The x-ray beam is a fan beam that traverses the object under study. As in 
medical computer axial tomography (CAT), densities of a cross sectional two- 
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dimensional slice can be determined. The inspected object is moved through the 
detector/ beam station by means of a conveyer belt, providing a series of multiple slices. 
Because all three dimensions are interrogated, by application of computer projection 
techniques a three dimensional view of the densities of the parts of an inspected body can 
be created. The spatial resolution of the order of millimeters can be obtained. In 
principle, the spatial resolution is as good as molecular dimensions since the x-rays have 
very short wavelengths, but practical realities such as the diameter of the x-ray pencil 
beam and detector size limit the resolution. 
The CT system operates and looks very .much like the medical CAT 
(computerized axial tomography) scanner. The origin of airport security CT is medical 
CAT where fast scanners were developed to freeze the image of the human heart even as 
it was beating. In principle, dual- and multi-energy CT is possible, as is incorporation of 
backscatter techniques. The reconstruction of the data from detecting x-rays is computer 
intensive. 
Computerized Tomography X-ray Scanners are extremely sophisticated and 
implementation costs are of concern. The intensive data gathering and computation 
required is time consuming and the present estimates of several hundred bags per hour is 
too slow for use on all checked baggage. The CT system has promise for a final 
inspection system after most of non-suspect baggages have been cleared using other 
systems such as ordinary x-ray machines. 
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RADIATION SAFETY ISSUES 
X-rays are electromagnetic radiation, which are classified as ionizing radiation. 
Ionizing radiation&, which includes, alpha rays, beta rays, protons, neutrons, and gamma 
rays, as well as x-rays, transfer enough energy to an atomic electron so that it is stripped 
from the atom, thereby ionizing the atom. Ionized atoms are extremely chemically active 
and can create reactions in biological cells. As nature has spent several billion years 
perfecting the cell, whatever chemical random reaction occurs within the cell have a far 
better chance of being harmful than helpful for the living organism. These disruptions 
can kill the cell, or, worse yet, can alter it in such a way so that the alteration is passed on 
when the cell divides into two cells. This propagation of altered cells is called a 
mutation, which may become responsible for causing cancer. 
Although X-rays were discovered in 1895, it was not until the 1920s that it was 
universally recognized that excessive radiation exposure could be harmful. Prior to that 
44 Alpha rays are composed of alpha particles which is the nucleus of the helium atom 
constituted of two protons (positively charged) and two neutrons. 
Beta rays are electrons which are negatively charged. 
Gamma rays are very energetic photons usually associated with nuclear processes. X- 
rays are also photons of lesser energy, usually associated with atomic electron processes. 
Protons are the positively charged particles which are the building blocks of the atomic 
nucleus. Neutrons are similar building blocks of the atomic nucleus; however, they are 
not charged. 
Ordinary natural radioactivity produces only alpha, beta, gamma and x-radiation. 
Protons and neutrons are usually associated non-normal or non-natural processes such as 
nuclear weapons detonation, reactors, high energy particle accelerators, exploding stars 
Protons and neutrons can arise from cosmic ray interactions, but the 
atmosphere protects us, at least near the earth’s surface. Inside a high flying airplane, the 
radiation level is higher due to cosmic rays. 
’ (supernova). 
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time, scientists, physicians and industrial workers often received a massive radiation 
dose45 and many developed malignancies and some died due to their cancerous effects 
even years after the exposure had ceased. In the early days, physicians used to test the x- 
ray tube by sticking their hands in front of it and observing their own bones. The initial 
unit of absorbed dose was the skin erythema dose, which was the amount of radiation 
necessary to cause reddening of the skin. 
The dose is a physical measure of the energy absorbed. For human beings, we are 
more concerned with the biological effects of the ionizing radiation. Alpha rays create 
more ionization than do beta, x- or gamma rays of the same energy, so they have a 
greater biological damaging effect. Alpha particles are more massive and travel 
relatively slowly compared to the speeds of the other radiation particles. The slower 
speed allows for greater interaction with atomic electrons in the biological medium. To 
account for the biological effectiveness of the radiation, the unit rem, Roentgen 
Equivalent Man, is used. REM is a cgs unit. The MKS unit is the Gray equal to 100 rem. 
Although there are technical differences, for practical purposes, a rem and a rad are 
equivalent for x-rays. 
, 45 Dose is a measure of energy deposited per mass of material. The common unit of dose 
is the rad, radiation.absorbed dose, which is equal to 100 ergs per gram of material. An 
erg is a unit of energy in the cgs (centimeter-gram-second) system which was common in 
many scientific fields until about the 1970’s. Today, the SI (systeme internationale) or 
MKS (meter-kiIogram-second) system of units is more commonly used. In that system, 
the unit for dose is Sievert equal to 1 Joule of energy absorbed per kilogram of material. 
100 rads = 1 Sievert. A Sievert provides enough energy to raise the temperature of a 
kilogram of water (2.2 pounds equal to about 2.2 pints) about one quarter of a degree 
centigrade or 2 degrees Fahrenheit (That’s akin to raising the temperature of two pints of 
beer by leaving it on the table for less time than it takes to consume the beer.) In terms of 
heat, a rad is pretty small, raising the temperature of a gram of water 0.0023 degree 
Centigrade. This comparison illustrates that the damage caused by ionizing radiation is 
not caused by direct energy input, but by atomic and chemical processes induced by 
ionization. 
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The environment exposes us to about 180 millirem per year, about half of which 
comes from natural sources such as cosmic rays* and radioactivity from heavy elements 
such as uranium and thorium in rocks and the other from man-caused sources. Medical 
diagnostic x-rays expose the average person living in the United States to almost as much 
as radiation as from natural sources. Other sources such as eating trace radioactive 
isotopes in foods such as No-Salt, bananas and dates add about 20 millirem. Smaller 
amounts are attributed to fallout from atmospheric nuclear weapons detonation prior to 
the Atmospheric Test Ban Treaty signed in the 1960's and to television screens. For the 
average person, the nuclear power industry's contribution to radiation exposure is 
miniscule (maybe about 0.003 millirem per year) compared to the radiation exposure due 
to natural causes. 
Under current practice, a person who is not classified as a radiation worker47 
should be exposed to no more than 100 millirem per year of radiation from non- 
environmental sources, an amount equivalent to that from natural radiation at sea levela. 
The atmosphere protects us from cosmic rays, most of which come from solar flares. 
At sea level, cosmic rays exposes us to about 41 millirem, whereas in the mile-high city 
of Denver, Colorado, cosmic ray exposure is 70 millirem and at 10,000 feet altitude in 
Leadville, Colorado, the exposure is 160 millerem per year. In a flight across from 
Washington D.C. to San Francisco, the author measured about 1.5 millirem inside a large 
commercial jet. This exposure was primarily due to cosmic rays at a flying altitude of 
30,000 feet which had penetrated the airplane fuselage. 
47 A radiation worker is classified as a person who is in a radiation protection program 
and is carefblly monitored medically and for exposure to radiation. These persons have 
an occupational reason, such as reactor operators, physicists working with accelerators, 
scientist working with radioactive sources, to work in a radiation environment. 
Radiation workers are limited to 5 rads per year of exposure. (There are provisions 
where greater exposure is allowed in order to save lives). 
48 The allowable exposure is a strictly regulatory limit. Airplanes flying at 30,000 feet 
may expose the passenger and crew to radiation levels 30 times that found on the ground 
since there is not as much atmosphere protecting the flyer as on the ground. This 
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An additional requirement is that exposure does not exceed 2.5 millirem per hour. These 
two requirements put limits on both the source strength and the amount of time a person 
can stay in a non-natural radiation environment. For practical purposes, in the aviation 
safety community, if the radiation exposure requirements are met for the operator of a x- 
ray interrogation device, the general passenger population will be well within the 
exposure limits. Beyond staying within the statutory limits, a general rule of ALARA, 
- As _Low As Beasonably Achievable, is observed. A L A R A 4 9  is a practice in prudence 
with the general philosophy that, the less exposure to radiation, the better. 
The radiation level from x-ray machines used for checking hand baggage is less 
than that from dental x-rays. The radiation exposure is almost non-existent on the outside 
of the scanner. Part of the reason for the bulkiness of x-ray equipment is to provide 
enough shielding and distance between the x-ray source and the operator and passengers. 
Computerized Tomography X-Ray scanners provide perhaps a hundred times more 
exposure, if the bare x-ray unit were not shielded. The CT machines require many x-ray 
images to be taken in order to construct a three dimensional image. The exposure due to 
a CT scanner can be likened to that used for cancer therapy. Looking at a CT x-ray 
scanner, one notices that it is much bulkier than a hand baggage machine. Much of that 
bulk can be attributed to the need for shielding to confine the radiation exposure to the 
baggage being interrogated. 
additional radiation does not fall within the exposure limited by the Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission since it is from '(natural" sources. 
49 You might notice that the next time you get a dental x-ray, the operator places a lead 
filled apron over your body and then leaves the room. The apron reduces your exposure, 
but since the dental technician has to give many x-rays, he minimizes his annual exposure 
by leaving the room each time he performs an x-ray. 
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Because the x-ray exposure to the target is minimal, manufacturer advisories usually 
dictate that the very fastest films (ASA 800 and above) may be affected by going through 
the hand baggage checking x-ray machine. Fast film should be declared separately and 
not sent through the CT machine. 
Because the emphasis is ALARA, developmental work in x-ray machines is to 
create techniques and detectors which minimize the amount of x-ray needed to obtain a 
contrast image. 
The backscatter x-ray machines are considerably more efficient for detection. 
This is partly because the primary x-ray beam does not have to penetrate a thick body. 
Any x-ray that does not go completely through a body into the detector contributes to the 
dose in a conventional machine. For the backscatter machine, the x-rays are bounced 
back to the detector and the absorption within the target body need not be as great. An 
image requires about the same amount of exposure50 as would be obtained from cosmic 
rays flying for a few minutes in an airplane at 30,000 to 40,000 feet. Consequently, the 
backscatter x-ray machine can be used to search people who may try to access restricted 
areas. Should the backscatter x-ray scanner be required to check baggage, the x-rays 
would need to get though the baggage walls and the backscattered x-rays would also have 
to return through the same wall. Backscattered x-rays are best used to interrogate items 
close to the surface on the side of the x-ray machine. Consequently, when this technique 
is used for baggage inspection, the machines may have x-ray sources on two sides, or else 
the bags may have to be turned 180" so both sides may be interrogated. 
50 The exposure is of the order of 10 microrem or less. 
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VAPOR ANALYSIS 
Explosives may sometimes be detected in trace amounts because they may be 
volatile. Man-made vapor detectors must first collect a sufficiently large sample of 
molecules; second, remove interfering materials and impurities and then the sample must 
be concentrated. Finally, the technique must test the remaining material so that a unique 
signature of the presence of explosive compounds may be detected. 
The problem with many explosives is that they have very low vapor pressure5* so 
that the first step, the collection of an adequately large sample of molecules presents a 
formidable challenge. 
The volatility of explosive ranges from EGDN, which will be present in a 
saturated volume of room temperature air at a relatively high concentration of one part in 
ten thousand52, to HMX which has a vapor pressure which will present concentrations of 
the order of two parts in one hundred trillion. A saturated vapor of nitroglycerine will 
51 Molecules are in constant motion. In a solid or a liquid, molecules can escape and go 
into the surrounding air. The molecules which are above the solid or liquid exert a 
pressure. At equilibrium vapor pressure, just as many molecules re-enter the solid or 
liquid as escape. Vapor pressure refers to the pressure exerted by a vapor when it is in 
equilibrium with the solid or liquid. The magnitude of the vapor pressure depends on the 
nature of the solid or liquid and on the temperature. Molecules which have a large 
mutual attraction have a small tendency to escape into the vapor phase. Such a material 
has a low vapor pressure. As the temperature of a material is raised, the average kinetic 
energy (energy of motion) of its molecules increases. The number of higher energy 
molecules capable of escaping the solid or liquid increases so that the vapor pressure 
increases. 
52 EGDN is very similar in molecular construction to automobile anti-freeze and like its 
antifreeze cousin, even a relatively insensitive detection device such as the human nose is 
able to smell its presence. 
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contain about one molecule per million molecules of air; ammonium nitrate and TNT53 
will be present in concentrations of about one part in 100 million; and plastic explosives 
will have even smaller concentrations; PETN and RDX having concentrations of about 
one part in a trillion. To put this in perspective, one part in a trillion is comparable to a 
single shot glass of single malt scotch poured into Loch Ness, Scotland. 
Whatever vapor detection scheme is used, the concentration of the sample is a 
critical step towards improving the chances of explosive detection. However, the 
concentration step may also concentrate other benign molecules and the incidence of 
false alarms may increase considerably. 
Samples to be checked for the presence of explosives may be collected from the 
air around the target person or luggage or else a “swipe” may be taken over a container to 
collect any loose contaminants. In manufacturing or packaging explosives, it is very 
difficult to place the explosive into a case without some trace mount  of the explosive 
being deposited on the container. In most scenarios, the most suspect contamination 
region would be the area around the luggage lock. 
The sample is collected by running the air or the luggage over a surface onto 
which the sticky explosive molecules attach themselves. The explosive molecules are 
now concentrated onto a solid surface, which is then heated within a contained volume. 
In the case of sniffing, the molecules are driven off of the surface and carried away in a 
stream of smaller volume of gas than the originally sampled air. 
53 Vapor detection may rely upon vapors other than the explosives, but rather upon other 
molecules which are almost always found in the explosive. For example, it is suspected 
that dogs trained to sniff explosives may be detecting dinitrotoluene, DNT, a common 
contaminant in trinotrotoluene, TNT. DNT may be found in concentrations of ne part in 
a million, whereas TNT may be in concentrations which may be 100 times less. 
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The process of heating drives off the explosive from the sampling surface and 
may even break-up the explosive compound and a large fraction of the molecules may be 
lost in the heating process. This step may increase the concentration of explosive 
molecules, but the absolute number of molecules will most likely be diminished. The 
thermal instability of the explosive compounds may cause a degradation of the explosive 
molecule into smaller fragments that may go unrecognized by some detection equipment. 
On the other hand, other detection equipment may rely upon the fragmentation of 
the explosive molecules. For example, energetic electrons or atoms of inert gas may 
break up the explosive molecules and the fragments themselves may be analyzed to 
expose the presence of the explosive. This process is used in two stage vapor detectors 
such GSMS, gas chromatography and mass spectrometry. 
Although it is quite possible to detect trace amounts of known explosives in a 
laboratory setting, the real world does not always present a controlled environment. The 
chemistry and the physics are known, but the engineering to make the equipment 
operationally usehl is a continuing challenge. 
Vapor detection schemes have the advantage of being amenable to automation. A 
portal through which passengers may pass could be the air collection device. The 
sampled air can be collected, concentrated, sent through a detection device and a fairly 
distinct electronic signal could alarm the operator as to the presence of explosives. In 
such a system, human error and lack of training may be minimized since the 
interpretation of the collected information is automated. Vapor detection does not suffer 
the public relations issues presented by ionizing radiation devices such as those using x- 
rays and can be used to interrogate living subjects. 
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Gas Chromatography 
Gas chromatography54 was introduced to the scientific community by 
A.T. James and A.J.P Martin in 1952. This instrument separates out mixtures of trace 
amounts of molecules and by correlating the time it takes from input to output with times 
for known molecules, identification may be made. The basic operating principle of the 
gas chromatograph requires the volatilization of a sample in a heated inlet port (injector), 
separation of the components of the mixture in a specially prepared column and detection 
of each component by a detector. An important component of gas chromatography is the 
carrier gas, such as helium or hydrogen, to transfer the sample from the injector, through 
the column and into the detector. The column separates out the various parts of the 
sample and the time to pass through the sample to the detector is measured. For gas 
chromatography, only those substances, which will not break up into smaller molecular 
parts, are suitable. The temperature at the injector and in the column must be carefully 
controlled. 
Helium is generally the carrier gas, but hydrogen and nitrogen are used in some 
chemistry applications. However, for explosive detection, hydrogen and nitrogen are not 
54 A number of separation procedures are based on differences in the degree to which 
various substances are adsorbed onto the surface of an inert material. (An inert material 
is one that does not undergo a chemical change.) Separations that use adsorption 
differences are known as chromatographic procedures. The word chromatography means 
‘graphing of colors’ and arose from its use in separating pigments. For example, a 
solution containing a mixture of colored pigments may be washed through a column 
packed with alumina (aluminum oxide, the white “rust” found on exposed aluminum 
surfaces). The various components will move through the column at different speeds due 
to differences in the degree to which they are adsorbed and will separate out into different 
color bands. 
In this discussion, the distinction between adsorption and absorption must be 
Adsorption is adherence to a surface and absorption is passage through the made. 
interior. Water is absorbed by a sponge. 
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good carrier gases because these are major components of explosives and the carrier gas 
should not be mistaken for the constituents of the explosive sample. The pneumatics, 
meaning the pressure control, must be such that the velocity of the carrier gas is stable 
and reproducible. 
Temperature control is important. Ideally, the programmed injector temperature 
is held near the boiling point of the suspected explosive, and the column temperature 
must be kept constant. In addition, temperature control may also be used to cool the 
sample vapor so that higher concentrations may be achieved. 
The gas chromatographic column separates different types of molecules from 
each other. The hollow column contains a thin layer of a nonvolatile chemical which is 
either coated onto the walls of the column (capillary columns) or coated onto an inert 
solid that is then added to the column (packed column). The components of the injected 
sample are carried through the column by the carrier gas and selectively retarded. The 
temperature of the oven in which the gas chromatographic resides is gradually increased 
so that higher boiling and more strongly retained components are successively released. 
In this set-up, at the lower temperatures, the most volatile molecules, which interact least 
with the column chemical, pass through first. As the temperature is raised, those that 
adhere to the column are released and take more time to pass through the column. 
The gas chromatograph can be used with a variety of detectors, some of which 
may themselves be used as discrimination devices. The gas chromatograph has the 
advantage of being the first stage discriminator in a vapor sampling system and other 
systems such as chemiluminescence, mass spectrometry, and electron capture detectors 
may be used in combination. 
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Flame ionization, thermal conductivity, flame photometric and electron capture 
detectors are found for general chemistry use. Their application for airline security and 
explosive detection depends on the ingenuity of the manufacturer. The sample, which 
has passed through the gas chromatograph, passes through a hydrogedair flame. Ions55 
and electrons created in the flame cause a current to flow in the gap between two 
electrodes. This small current can be amplified and measured and is used to indicate the 
passage of the sample. A variant of this flame ionization detector is the thermionic 
specific detector in which a small alkali 56 salt bead is placed in the burner jet. Nitrogen 
and phosphorous compounds react with the salt bead and enhance the current. 
The temperature of a hot filament is continuously monitored. The constant flow 
of the helium carrier gas maintains a constant temperature. However, when a compound 
of a different thermal conductivity passes over the hot filament, the temperature changes, 
thereby indicating the passage of the sample. 
~~ 
55 An ion is an atom or molecule which has one or more of its electrons removed. 
Because the electron is negatively charged, the ion is positively charged. Both electrons 
and ions can act as charge carriers and cause a current to flow between the electrodes. 
Ions may also be formed by adding extra electrons to a neutral atom or molecule. In this 
case the ion is negative. In general, ions are atoms or molecules which are not 
electrically neutral due to the absence or presence of an electron or electrons from their 
normal state. 
56 Salts are formed atoms which are held together by the mutual attraction of positive and 
negative ions. In solution, the charges are retained by the ions. Generally, salts do not 
form molecules, but in their solid form are crystalline in structure. Alkali metals are 
highly reactive metallic elements including lithium, sodium, potassium, rubidium, cesium 
and francium. The most common salt is sodium chloride, common table salt which form 
crystals of positive sodium ions and negative chlorine ions. Sodium chloride is an 
example of a alkali salt bead. 
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In a flame photometric detector the sample is burned in a hydrogedair flame as in 
the flame ionization detector, and optical filters are used to observe wavelengths57 
specific to sulhr and phosphorous. In principle, other specific wavelengths could also be 
detected to detect other elements. ,The photons of the specific wavelength may be 
changed into a measurable current with the use of photomultiplier tubes? 
In the electron capture detector, a radioactive source59 is used to ionize the carrier 
gas. Electrons from the ionization migrate to the anode and produce a steady current. If 
the gas chromatograph releases a compound that captures electrons, the current is 
reduced because the resulting negative ions move more slowly than electrons. The 
57 When an element is heated, certain specific wavelengths of light characteristic of the 
element are seen. These wavelengths correspond to the energy emitted as photons when 
electrons which have been excited from their normal states return. What we mean by 
color is the wavelength of the electromagnetic radiation (photons). The product of the 
frequency and wavelength of electromagnetic radiation equals the speed of light, so color 
is associated uniquely with wavelength and light. 
58 When a photon of the right energy range hits the face of a photomultiplier tube 
(photocathode), an electron is released (photo-electric effect). This electron is 
accelerated to a plate (dynode) within the photomultiplier tube which is at a different 
electrical potential from the photocathode. When the electron strikes the dynode, several 
electrons are released. (usually 5 or more) These electrons are further accelerated to the 
next stage dynode which is at a higher electrical potential, where upon more electrons are 
released from the impact of each of the electrons. The photomultiplier tube consists of a 
series of dynodes and a final anode in which at each stage there is a multiplication of 
electrons. At the final stage anode, a measureable current is detected. If ten stages are 
used with a factor of five multiplication of electrons at each stage, the number of 
electrons are 1, 5,25,125, ... ,lo7. The original single photon has resulted in ten million 
electrons at the anode, resulting in a current that can be measured. 
59 The radioactive source is often 63Ni (nickle), which is a beta emitter. Beta particles are 
electrons which come from within the nucleus. 63Ni is chosen because it has a half-life of 
100 years, so does not need changing during the lifetime of the instrument. In the beta 
decay of 63Ni, the nickel nucleus releases an electron and transforms itself into 63Cu 
(copper), which is stable. 
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electron capture detector is very sensitive to materials that capture electrons. Most 
explosive molecules have this behavior@. 
Gas Chromatography with Chemiluminescence 
Hand held units and walk-through detectors are available which collect samples 
by effectively “vacuuming” the target. In the hand held units, the collection unit sucks 
air from near a surface which has been heated with infrared lamps. The heating is 
important since vapor pressure is increased by a factor of ten for every increase of ten 
degrees centigrade. The sample is then injected into a gas chromatograph, which 
separates out different molecules by their time of flight through the gas chromatograph 
columns. With proper calibration, molecules of different types can be identified by the 
gas chromatograph. At the detector end of the gas chromatograph, molecules, which 
might be suspected to be explosives, are heated until they are broken up into fragments. 
Among these fragments is nitric oxide, NO. Nitric oxide61 reacts with ozone, 03, and 
yields photons (ultraviolet light) of a particular wavelength, which can be detected. This 
60 The ability of an atom to attract electrons to itself in a chemical bond is referred to as 
electronegativity . Electronegativity are approximate measures of the relative tendencies 
of elements to attract electrons, but this property varies with the type of chemical 
environment in which an element is situated. The constituents of most explosives, 
carbon, nitrogen and oxygen have relatively high electronegativity. A related but not 
fully identical concept, the electron affinity, refers to the energy change that occurs when 
an electron is added to a gaseous atom or ion. The electron capture detector exploits the 
concept of electronegativity and not necessarily of electron affinity. 
61 Nitric oxide (NO) from the automobile internal-combustion engine combines with 
oxygen in the air to form N02. Ultraviolet radiation from the sun, which is also 
responsible for sunburn, breaks up the nitric oxide, N02, into NO and atomic oxygen, 0. 
The oxygen atom combines with the normal oxygen molecule, 02, to form ozone, 03, 
which is a very reactive molecule consisting of three oxygen atoms. The ozone reacts 
with other molecules, including hydrocarbons to form smog. 
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reaction detects the presence of nitrogen. With the additional information that the 
original molecule behaved as one in a group that includes explosives, an alarm can be set 
to expose the presence of explosives. The detection and analysis is not a simple task and 
a combination of gas chromatograph column lengths and temperature cycles can be 
optimized so that response to trace amounts of plastic explosives can be given. The same 
chemical reaction responsible for smog is used in a gas chromatograph with 
chemiluminescence to detect explosives, albeit with very much smaller quantities. 
Mass Spectrometry 
One of the most powerful analytical instruments is the mass spectrometer, 
especially used in conjunction with the gas chromatograph. A complete mass spectrum 
of the individual atoms can be obtained from a few nanogrand2 of material. 
In a mass spectrometer, a gaseous sample is introduced into the instrument and is 
then bombarded by a stream of high-energy electron@. Collisions between the electrons 
and the atoms or molecules of the gas produce positive ions. These ions of a given mass 
62 A nanogram is a billionth of a gram. Even a such a small amount of TNT would 
contain almost three trillion molecules. 
63 What may be considered high energy to one person is low energy to another. High and 
low energy are relative terms. In the mass spectrometer, the electrons have been 
accelerated over a 70 volt electrical potential difference. The electrons have a speed of 
about 5000 kilometers per second, which is very fast, but still relatively slow compared to 
the speed of light, 300,000 kilometers per second. Chemists would call this electron high 
energy, but a nuclear physicist would consider these low energy. In the context of the 
mass spectrometer, these electrons are high energy because they have sufficient energy to 
easily knock out one or more of the electrons in the atom or molecule and create ions. 
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and a single64 positive charge are accelerated towards a negatively charged wire grid. 
The ions pass through the grid and enter between the poles of a magnet. The accelerating 
grid gives the same energy to all the singly positive ions, but because the masses of 
different ions are different, the ion speeds are different. The magnetic fields bend. 
moving charged ions. The more massive ions have more momentum and are more 
difficult to bend. The ions are separated according to their masses because the radius of 
curvature of the bend depends on the masses of the ions. Lighter ions have smaller radii 
of curvature and more massive ions have larger radii of curvature. By continuously 
changing the strength of the magnet, the ions of different masses have the correct radius 
of curvature to pass into a small detector. 
An important component of the mass spectrometer is the vacuum system. The 
path through which the ions must traverse must be free of other molecules or ions so that 
the sample ion does not suffer further collision in its path from ionization, through the 
magnetic field to the detector. Typically, vacuums between10m5 to lo-* to+5 are 
64 The energies of the bombarding electrons are chosen that the most probable ionization 
is caused by knocking out one electron from the neutral atom or molecule. 
65 A tom is the pressure necessary to support a column of mercury one millimeter high. 
Atmospheric pressure will support a column of mercury 760 millimeter or approximately 
30 inches high. The torr is a metric unit named after Evangelista Torricelli (608 - 1647) 
who became Galileo Galilei’s assistant just three months before the great man’s death. 
Prior to this time, water was used to measure pressure, but a water column of 10.3 meters 
or over 30 feet was needed to measure atmospheric pressure. Torricelli came up with the 
brainstorm to substitute water with the denses material known, mercury, which is 13.6 
times that of water. 
Galileo (1 565 - 1642), who discovered the moon Jupiter had many interests. Besides 
being the first to understand the falling motion on earth, he formulated the thoughts 
which made us realize that a suction pump could only pump water up to a certain limit, 




Vacuums better than lo-* torr are required in the manufacture of 
Some mass spectrometers use electrical quadrupoles instead of magnets to 
separate ions of different masses. An electric quadrupole consists of four cylindrical 
rods, two positively and two negatively charged. The cylinders of like charge lie 
opposite of each other. In this configuration, cylinders of opposite charge are placed 
separated but adjacent to each other. There is a small space through which charged ions 
can travel between the quadrupole cylinders. The electric quadrupole has the feature that 
a charged particle traversing in the exact center axis between the two positive and two 
negative cylinders will not suffer a deflection. If the ion is not exactly on the center, the 
ion will suffer a defection because the electrical forces from the four charged cylinders do 
not exactly cancel. The sample ion stream is injected into the charged quadrupole rods. 
Both a direct current @C) and an oscillating radiofrequency (RF) signal is applied 
across the rods, with adjacent rods having opposite charge. 
The ion stream entering the quadrupole is forced into a corkscrew motion through 
the space between the four rods. The combination of the DC and RF field applied to the 
rods induces deflection of the ion stream from the central axis. At a particular 
combination of DC and RF fields, only ions of a particular mass follow a path through 
the axis. Ions of greater and lesser mass follow an unstable decaying path and end up 
colliding with the walls of the quadrupole pass. The DC/RF field is swept to pass 
through ions of different masses and a mass spectrum& is obtained. 
66 A mass spectrum is a graph of number of ions plotted against the mass. The resolution 
of mass spectrometers are better than half the mass of a proton or neutron, so separation 
of molecules according to their molecular weights is possible. In analyzing ions of a 
single element, there is sufficient resolution to see different masses due to difference in 
isotope mass. 
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At the output of the mass spectrometer, whether it is a magnetic or quadrupole 
analyzer, a detector is present to measure the presence of the ion. Usually the detector 
consists of a material coated with cathode material so that the ion striking the detector 
will cause electrons to be released. After that the same series of events as in the 
photomultiplier tube causes a cascade of electrons and results in a sufficient current to be 
detectable. The multiplication need not necessarily be that of electrons, but the material 
could be chosen to produce an ion cascade. The detector multiplication stages need not 
be physically in stages, but could be a bent tube in which each electron or ion impact 
directs more electrons or ions to another part of the detector where further multiplication 
of the signal can progress. Such a device is sometimes called a “~hanneltron~~ because 
the charged particle cascade is “channeled” down to the final stage. 
Ion Mobility Spectrometer 
Functionally, the ion mobility spectrometer67, IMS, is similar to the gas 
chromatograph in that differing molecular species are separated in traversing through the 
instrument. The difference in time in a gas chromatograph depends upon the adhesion of 
the molecules to the column coating and the separation is due to molecular and atomic 
interactions. In the case of the ion mobility spectrometer, the time separation occurs 
because of speed differences between molecules of different mass. 
67 Descriptions of ion mobility spectrometers are not commonly found in introductory 
chemistry texts. The IMS is not a precise analytical chemistry tool, but a rather 
straightforward simple device that measures the mass of molecules. IMS is akin to 
weighing the molecule. The molecular mass is determined, but there may be many 
different molecules with the same mass. IMS is more u se l l  as tool for detecting the 
presence of molecules which are different from that normally expected in an 
environment. Discussion of IMS may be found more commonly in process engineering 
texts. 
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Air containing vapor or a stream of airborne particles from an area to be tested is 
drawn into a sampling probe. Air and explosive molecules diffuse through a membrane 
or a filter into a chamber where a sealed 63Ni radioactive68 source ionizes the sample. 
The ionization of the sample is due to the beta particle from the decay of nickle-63. 
Every twenty milliseconds or so, a small burst of ions is released into a separation region 
by an electronic gating grid. These ions move under the influence of an electric field 
down a drift tube against the flow of a separation gas. The speed of the ions is 
determined by their mass, charge, physical shape and the amount of diffusion69 in the 
presence of the separation gas. Heavier, complicated ions, such as explosives, tend to 
travel more slowly than lighter, simpler ions, such as found in air. The ions reaching the 
collector can be detected as an electric current signal. The time and the magnitude of the 
peak caused by the number of ions into the detector are analyzed and a mass separation is 
achieved. 
Much of the work in development of ion mobility spe'ctrometer is related to the 
detection of environmental pollutants, but the results are easily applicable to the detection 
of explosives. In the airport security environment, the same IMS technology can also be 
68 6%i is a radioactive beta (electron) emitter with a half-life of 100 years. In the 
transformation of its nucleus from '%Ji to 63Cu, an electron with an energy of 66 
kiloelectron volts is emitted. These decay electrons have about 2.5 times the energy 
typically used to illuminate a television screen. The source is sealed with a very thin 
metal foil (usually aluminum) in order to prevent radioactive nickle from spilling out into 
the chamber. Nickle-63 has a long enough half-life so that the source does not have to be 
constantly replaced. 
A half-life is the period of time for half the radioactive nuclei to have decayed into 
different nuclei, usually called the daughter nucleus. In the case of 63Ni, starting out 
with a million nuclei, after a hundred years, only half a million of the nuclei would be 
nickel-63. The remainder would have transformed into the daughter, copper-63. 
69 By diffusion is meant the deviation from a straight line path. 
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used to detect narcotics. The IMS usually does not unequivocally identify the presence 
of a particular explosive, but usually provides a signature that some unexpected molecule, 
which may be an explosive, is present. There is little dispute that IMS is capable for 
explosive detection in the laboratory environment. The challenge in the development of 
ion mobility spectrometer is its operational sensitivity and utility. 
Canines 
Operationally, dogs have been used to detect explosives, not only in the airport 
environment, but also in other environments, such as for the detection of landmines. 
These dogs must be specifically trained to detect explosives. A canine trained for 
narcotics detection or for finding people buried in a collapsed building may not 
necessarily be useful for explosive detection. Dogs require extensive training and need to 
be bonded and trained by a handler who must respond to explosive detection alarms with 
the dog. Veterinary care, attention, high protein diet and grooming are all required to 
maintain the dog's value. In addition, periodic refresher training for both dogs and 
handlers is required. Like humans, dogs have a limited attention span, and must be given 
recreation breaks to maintain its efficiency and alertness. The cost of maintaining an 
explosive detection canine is high because of the need for these requirements in addition 
for the salary and maintenance of the handler. 
Dogs have an extremely sensitive odor detection capability70. The olfactory 
mechanism are probably the least understood of the senses which include hearing, seeing, 
7O There is suspicion that the trained dog may be detecting the more volatile 
dinitrotoluene, DNT, rather than trinotrotoluene, TNT. It is practically impossible to 
create the explosive TNT without having trace amounts of DNT which has a vapor 
pressure two orders of magnitude greater. 
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touching and smelling. It is only within the past decade that it was discovered that 
mammals recognize odors via roughly one thousand receptors in the nasal cavity. When 
they encounter a molecule, these receptors change shape, prompting the nerve to send a 
smell signal back to the brain, which produces the sensation of odor. Smell receptors are 
distributed more or less randomly within the nasal cavity and the information from these 
receptors is then focused onto elegantly structured “smell maps” within the all-important 
olfactory bulbs, which are a pair of blueberry-sized structures that serve as the relay 
center between the nose and the brain. 
Each nerve cell in the olfactory epithelium holds only one type of receptor, but 
there are many thousands of every type of nerve fiber, and thus of every type of receptor, 
scattered across the epithelium. But when those nerve cells send their signals through 
connecting tissue, or axons, back to the olfactory bulbs, the axon projecting from the 
same class of fibers ends up hitting a single node in one of the bulbs. In that way, the 
relative chaos of the odor-collection mechanism is reduced to a military-like order of 
information within the bulb. The smell system considers an odor from multiple angles, 
with one receptor recognizing one chemical signature of the odor molecule - say, a fatty 
acid chain of a particular length - while another receptor tunes into a slightly different 
segment of the odor. The brain then synthesizes the disparate bits of infomation into a 
coherent label that experience has recorded as, for example, TNT. With a thousand 
receptors to mix and match, the number of possible combinations for detecting smells is 
stupendously large. However, the human brain lacks the processing capability to utilize 
all the possible olfactory signals. The dog, having evolved to make greater use of 
olfaction for survival, may be able to process smell signals in greater combinations, thus 
explaining their olfactory sensitivity. 
. 
86 
The understanding of the olfactory detection mechanism is in its infancy, but 
should not be overlooked as possibly leading to a breakthrough technology for explosive 
detection. 
Chemical detection methods exploited to date for use in airline security have 
emphasized the mechanical detection of explosive signatures. They are still extremely 
rudimentary in the combination of mechanical detection using several sensors and signal 
processing. In effect, the olfactory system of living creatures is as powerful as it is 
because the senses exploit a combination of sensors and data integration. 
Electronic Noses 
In the past few years, researchers have begun to develop electronic systems that 
tend to mimic the sensory system. The combination of advances in sensor materials and 
in powefiul computer chips hold forth a promise of non-biological devices, which could 
potentially detect threats from bacteria in food to explosives in luggage or land mines. 
The design of a typical electronic nose has two major components: a sensor that detects 
odors and a set of electronic components that interprets the resulting signals. The sensor 
incorporates various materials, which could include metal oxides or advanced polymers. 
When exposed to certain volatile compounds, the sensor material changes some 
characteristic such as color, size or their resistance to electricity. The full understanding 
of the mechanism to detect the "smell" is not necessary since the computer analysis of the 
detected change can be correlated to "pre-learned" signals from known compounds. 
The individual components can be very small, with perhaps dozens incorporated 
onto a single computer chip. They can respond to odors in concentration well below 
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what the human olfactory system can detect. In addition, they can be made sensitive to 
hazardous mixtures that may even be odorless to people. 
Interest in this technology comes from many industries. Laboratories of the U.S. 
Department of Agriculture are aware that electronic noses can recognize gases produced 
by bacteria in tainted poultry; the transportation industry sees potential for identifying 
spoilage of foods in refrigerated trucking; changes in corn, canola and soybean oils could 
be correlated by electronic noses rather than subjecting human taste testers to the rather 
unpleasant task of discrimination; and these techniques could, in principle, be able to 
differentiate between tomatoes picked green or vine-ripened. 
Beyond the obvious applications for the food industry, environmental sampling 
may identify sources of pollution. The ability to "sniff" explosives is being addressed by 
projects sponsored by the Defense Advanced Projects Research Agency in an effort to 
detect land mines. Direct detection of explosives may find their way into systems 
developed for airport security. 
Variants of the ''electronic nose" include the "electronic tongue". When the 
sensor is submersed in a liquid, small polystyrene beads coated with one of several 
fluorescent materials display distinct pattern of colors. Electronic tongues could find 
operation in quality control of food processing and as quick, in-office, medical diagnostic 
tests such as blood and urine analysis. 
In one particular effort [SN98], a sensor uses a single type of fluorescent-doped 
polymer that glows brightly after exposure to daylight but dims dramatically when even a 
single molecule of explosive vapor attaches anywhere along the polymer molecule. 
Detection of TNT concentration at levels as low as 100 parts per quadrillion are claimed. 
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This concentration level is equivalent to an eyedropper of chemical dissolved in a volume 
that could fill 25 Exxon Valdez-size supertankers. 
Because the electronic nose relies upon a change in some physical characteristic 
such as fluorescence, size and electrical resistance, when a particular chemical is 
encountered, a detailed understanding of the chemistry in not necessary. What is 
required is pattern recognition, which can be correlated with known explosive samples. 
With an electronic nose, the more it is used, the more feedback can be given to the 
system so that it can experientially "learn" from experience. 
These systems offer the advantage over canines and humans in that the effects of 
subjectivity and fatigue can be diminished. However, their application is still in the 
research stage and readily available off-the-shelf technology has not yet been fully 
developed. 
NUCLEAR CHEMISTRY 
Techniques relying on nuclear physics71 can be used to detect the presence of 
contraband. However, although the signatures rely on nuclear interactions, what is 
71 An atom is composed of a very dense positively charged nucleus and negatively 
charged electrons. In the simplest model, the electrons can be thought to be in planetary 
like orbits around the nucleus. The positive electrical charge of the nucleus is exactly 
matched by the negative electrical charge of the electrons, so the atom is electrically 
neutral. In this model, if the nucleus of the lightest atom, the hydrogen nucleus were to 
be represented by a basketball, the electron would be in an orbit about 20 miles away. 
The electron has a mass about one two thousandths that of the hydrogen nucleus. 
The nucleus is composed of protons which are positively charged and neutrons which 
are electrically neutral. For lighter atoms, the number of protons is about the same as the 
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actually being determined is the chemical composition of the object being interrogated. 
Nuclear-based, explosive detection systems can detect unique and generally unambiguous 
signatures of contraband via the unique nuclear structure of the isotope. 
Nuclear techniques use highly penetrating radiation as probes and induce 
penetrating radiation signatures. The radiation is generally neutrons and/or gamma rays. 
Gamma rays are photons and are electromagnetic radiation with the same intrinsic 
characteristics as x-rays, except with very much greater energy72. The gamma ray is 
more penetrating than the x-ray because of its higher energy. The neutron is generally 
number of neutrons. For example, ordinary oxygen has 6 protons and 6 neutrons in its 
nucleus. (The lightest atom, hydrogen, is an exception to this general rule and the 
ordinary hydrogen nucleus has only a proton and no neutron.) For heavier atoms, the 
number of neutrons exceeds the number of protons. For example, the nucleus of the lead 
atom has 82 protons and 126 neutrons. The number of electrons in a neutral atoms equals 
the number of protons. When one or more electrons are stripped off of the atom, there is 
an excess of positive charge and the partially stripped atom is called a positive ion. 
When extra electrons attach themselves to a neutral atom, the system is called a negative 
ion. 
When reactions or combinations are made in which the atomic electrons are affected, we 
generally call this a chemical reaction. Nuclear reactions are those events in which the 
protons and neutrons inside an atomic nucleus is disturbed. 
Nuclei with the same number of protons have the same number of electrons and are the 
same element. Even though the same number of protons exist in a nucleus, a different 
number of neutrons may be in the nucleus. These are called isotopes. Isotopes of the 
same atom behave almost identically in chemical reactions. However, the nuclear 
physics of isotopes is very different. 
72 The distinction between x-rays and gamma rays is somewhat arbitrary. They are both 
photons, electromagnetic radiation. One simple convenient distinction could be that x- 
rays are created in atomic processes by the movement of electrons and gamma rays come 
from within the nucleus and are the result of movement or rearrangements of protons and 
neutrons. Another distinction could be that generally, x-rays have energies of the order 
of thousands of electron volts. Gamma rays have energies in the millions of electron 
volts. There is an ambiguous overlap in these distinctions. 
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more penetrating because it does not possess an electrical charge and its interaction with 
atoms is by direct collision with the atomic nucleus. Charged particles such as protons 
and electrons can interact with each other at a distance by their electromagnetic 
interactions. The neutron must rely upon the strong nuclear force, which has a much 
smaller range of interaction. Since the nucleus is contained in a very small volume of the 
atom, the chances for the neutron hitting the nucleus are generally very small. 
The penetrability of nuclear radiation presents an advantage in making nuclear 
explosive detection systems amenable to hlly automated operation and decision making. 
The level of interaction has the potential to make the interrogation effectively non- 
intrusive. With minimal need for human decision intervention, the throughput rate has 
potential to not adversely affect airport routine. Although these criteria are goals, in 
practice, the state of technology has not yet achieved their full promise for most systems. 
Because nuclear techniques require ionizing radiation, radiation protection is a 
primary consideration, especially radiation protection of living beings, including the 
operator and passenger. In addition, there is a potential, in principle, for nuclear 
activation of the interrogated object. These safety considerations increase the 
engineering complexity and cost. The discussion of radiation safety issues, presented 
previously when x-ray systems were considered, applies to nuclear radiation as well. As 
a general consideration, the shielding requirements for neutrons and gamma rays are 
much greater than for x-rays. 
The generic symbol to denote a nuclear reaction is (x,y), where x denotes the 
incoming projectile and y denotes the outgoing particle. In this context, particle may 
refer to a photon, an electromagnetic particle that includes, light, ultraviolet light, x-rays 
and gamma rays. Generically, gamma rays are designated with the Greek symbol 
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gamma, y. Other particles which are commonly used are neutrons, n, protons, p, the 
alpha particle73, a, or electrons, f3, standing for the beta particle. Sometimes y may be 
two or more symbols, e.g. np, indicating that more than one particle may be detected 
from the reaction. Examples of reactions used in explosive detection systems are (n,y), 
(n,n), (n,x y), (y,y) (y,n), (y,p) and (y,xn). The x may designate other particles including 
other nuclei or fission fragments. In techniques using nuclear reactions, the construction 
and control of the probe and the detection of the signature constitute engineering 
challenges. 
The design of an explosive detection system must include not only consideration 
of the reactions but many other technical issues. Among these are what sources of 
radiation to use. Radioisotopes and accelerators are two possible sources, and the 
application may depend on whether pulsed or steady state sources are to be used. The 
design of the detector is critical. Type, size, efficiency of detection, energy resolution, 
time resolution, sensitivity to probing radiation and stability all affect performance. 
Electronics and data acquisition hardware and software choices must be made, 
considering counting rate and data rate. Miniaturization may affect not only cost, but 
also feasibility of application. Structural and shielding materials may be affected by 
prosaic considerations such as the floor loading capacity of the part of the airport terminal 
in which the system is to be placed. In addition, the hardware and software required for 
decision analysis, image reconstruction, and the level of human operator intervention 
need to be considered. 
73 The alpha particle, a, is the nucleus of the helium atom composed of a tightly bound 
system of to neutrons and two protons. 
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Neutrons 
Neutrons have the advantage of not having a charge, so it may penetrate a fair 
amount of material before encountering a capture or “collision”. They do not interact 
with atomic electrons in any significant way because there is no charge to charge 
interaction. Because they are some 2000 times more massive than an electron, they 
almost do not “feel” the presence of electrons in their path. They suffer capture and 
“collisions” with atomic nuclei, but since neutrons and nuclei comprise only a very small 
fraction of the size ,of the atom, these interactions are relatively rare and the neutron 
stands a very good chance of probing deep into the inspected material. 
The use of neutrons as a probe for explosive detection can be divided into two 
Slow basic types, slow and fast, depending on the speed of the probing neutrons. 
neutrons can be captured and fast neutrons can suffer resonant ~ca t te r ing~~.  
Thermal Neutron Analysis (TNA) 
Thermal neutron analysis (TNA) involves the use of neutrons, which are traveling 
through the inspected material at a slow enough speed75 ,so that it can be captured. A 
74 Resonant scattering occurs at a specific neutron energy where the target nucleus looks apparently much 
larger than the geometrical size. The probability of an event occuning is expressed in terms of a “cross 
section”. In the macroscopic world, the cross section is the geometrical size overlap of the target and the 
probe. If the cross section is large, there is a greater probability for the probe and the target interacting than 
if the cross section is small. In the microscopic world, the concept is extended to mean the probability of 
the occurrence of an interaction If the cross section is large, the probability of the something happening is 
large, and if the cross section is small, the probability is small. The cross section is this context may have 
very little to do with the geometrical size of either the probe or the target. 
75 The neutrons are “thermal” in that their speed arises from the kinetic motion due to the 
temperature. At room temperature, the neutron has a speed of approximately 2.6 km/s 
which is “ slow” compared to the speed of light, 300,000 km/s. Sometimes the term 
“thermal” may refer to the temperature as the neutron comes out of a reactor in which 
case the speed may be of the order of 5 km/s, which is still “slow”. 
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slow neutron can suffer capture by nitrogen, which is an important constituent of 
explosives. Specifically, when a neutron is captured by the common nitrogen isotope, 
14N, the nitrogen-14 becomes nitrogen-15, ‘?N. The nucleus of 14N contains 7 protons 
and 7 neutrons. The nucleus of 15N contains 7 protons and 8 neutrons. The ‘’N which is 
formed by neutron capture is not formed in the lowest energy state, but as an excited 
nuclear state. The nucleus subsequently de-excites, almost immediately, and a very 
specific energy gamma ray of 10.8 MeV is released in the de-excitation process76. This 
gamma ray signature is very specific and there are no natural processes, which create 
gamma rays of this particular energy. In fact, only nuclear processes can create gamma 
rays of such high energy. The (n,y) capture reaction in nitrogen constitutes a clear 
signature for the presence of nitrogen. In addition, to this particular reaction, other 
reactions involving the interaction of thermal neutrons with elements encountered in 
passenger bags are well known. 
An item of luggage is moved through a “bath” of thermal neutrons generated by a 
radioactive source7 or an neutron generator (particle accelerator78). The capture of a 
neutron in nitrogen results in a high-energy gamma ray produced by the reaction 
~ ~~ 
76 10.8 MeV is 10.8 million electron volts. A visible light photon has approximately 2 
electron volts energy a medical x-ray has order 30 thousand electron volts (30 keV). 
Consequently, the gamma ray, y, is many orders of magnitude more energetic. 
7 The radioactive source is usually californium-252, 252Cf, which spontaneously 
fissions releasing one to several neutrons. The neutrons have may have several million 
electron volt energy, but they are “thermalized” by passing through a shield containing 
many protons. motice that the symbol of californium is Cf rather than the postal symbol 
for the state of California, CA. Ca is the chemical symbol for calcium]. 
78 The particle accelerator accelerates a proton (the nucleus of the hydrogen atom) to 
about 100 kiloelectron volts of kinetic energy on to a target containing heavy hydrogen 
(deuterium, an isotope of hydrogen with a nucleus containing one proton and one 
neutron). The proton strikes the deuteron and breaks it up into a proton and neutron. 
[Deuterium refers to the atom and deuteron refers to the nucleus]. The in the breakup, 
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14N + thermal neutron + ’%* + ‘3 + y ( 10.8 MeV) 
Although in principle, similar reactions could be used to detect signature gamma 
rays from. the capture of hydrogen, chlorine and other constituent elements,, currently 
thermal neutron analysis systems are designed to detect primarily nitrogen, not carbon 
nor oxygen. The system has limited spatial resolution. Because all nitrogen equivalently 
capture the thermal neutron, current TNA systems acting alone tend to have a high false 
alarm rate. The sensitivity of TNA to lower the quantity of explosives that can be found 
can be lowered, however, this increased sensitivity is achieved at the expense of 
increased false alarms. 
Present systems contain moderate strength californium sources of approximately 
80 millicurie79, emitting 350 million neutrons per second (in addition to three billion 
alpha particles per second. The alpha particles do not constitute as significant a shielding 
problem as do the neutrons.) Neutron sources must be well shielded. The shielding 
consists of hydrogen rich materials surrounded by heavier elements. The neutron- 
hydrogen collisions slow down the neutrons, which must subsequently be captured in the 
shielding material. After capture gamma rays must be attenuated in a denser material 
such as lead. Consequently, the entire system must be very massive. Current systems 
weigh close to 14 tons and take up a large amount of real estate. 
2.2 million electron volts of energy are released. The neutron from the reaction passes 
through a shield containing hydrogen and by many collisions, it slows down 
(“thermalizes”). These thermal (slow) neutrons sent into the inspection luggage. 
79 A Curie is a unit of radioactivity. A Curie (Ci) is 3.8 x 1010 disintegrations per 
second. The SI or metric system unit for radioactivity is a Becquerel @q) equal to one 
disintegration per second. Consequently, a Ci is 3.8 x 1010 Bq. Historically, a Curie is 
approximately the radioactivity found in one gram of radiuum. 
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Fast Neutron Analysis (FNA) 
An improvement on thermal neutron analysis may be made by using more 
energetic neutrons. When neutrons of a significant fraction of the speed of light impinge 
upon carbon, oxygen and nitrogen nuclei, they are scattered into directions and with 
energies, which can be readily detected and distinguished. For instance, 14-MeV 
(million electron volt kinetic energy) neutronsm interacting with oxygen, carbon and 
nitrogen produce 6.1, 4.4 and 5.1 MeV gamma rays respectively. In these reactions, the 
nucleus scatters the neutron and the nucleus is placed into an excited state. The nucleus 
de-excites and releases a very specific energy gamma ray, characteristic of the target 
nucleus. The three specific neutron scattering reactions relevant to fast neutron analysis 
are: 
n (14 MeV) + l60 -+ l60* + n (7.9 MeV) 
U 
l60 + y  (6.1 MeV) 
n (14 MeV) + I2C 4 12C* + n (9.6 MeV) 
U 
'C + y (4.4 MeV) 
80 14 MeV neutrons have speeds approximately 17 % that of the speed of light. The 14 
MeV neutrons are produced by the d - t reaction in which deuteron is made to impinge on 
a target containing tritium. [Deuterium is heavy hydrogen with one proton and one 
neutron and tritium is radioactive heavy hydrogen with one proton and two neutrons. 
The nuclei of deuterium and tritium are called the deuteron and triton, respectively.] The 
reaction for the production of 14 MeV neutrons is d + t ( - + n + 17.6 MeV. The neutron 
carries away 14 MeV of kinetic energy and the remainder is carried away by the alpha 
particle. The alpha particle, being charged and more massive, does not travel very much 
further and captures a couple of electrons to become a helium gas molecule. The alpha 
particle is the nucleus of the helium atom containing two protons and two neutrons. 
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n (14 MeV ) + 14N + I4N* + n (8.9 MeV) 
U 
I4N+y (5.1 MeV) 
In the notation above, * indicates that the nucleus is in an excited state and the gamma 
ray of specific energy is emitted during the de-excitation process. The relatively high 
energy gamma rays are detected in these reactions. 
The engineering differences for source, radiation shielding and the gamma ray 
detection array are significant between the fast neutron analysis, FNA, and the thermal 
neutron analysis, TNA. For fast neutron analysis, an accelerator, not a radioactive source 
must be used. Because the neutrons are significantly more energetic, almost certainly 
more shielding is required. The detectors could be the same, but in the scattering process, 
better differentiation of the gamma rays in energy and direction provides better 
discrimination among various reactions possibilities. Fast neutron analysis could also, in 
principle, detect hydrogen content as well if the scattered neutron were detected with 
information as to its energy. Consequently, a better detection system would be more 
beneficial for fast neutron analysis compared to that for thermal neutron analysis. 
The obvious potential for FNA is that it makes an essentially unambiguous 
determination of the presence of common explosives. However, the FNA presents 
operational shortcomings because the fast neutrons create a significant background in the 
gamma-ray detector. The airport environment presents limitations because of the 
presence of passengers and airport personnel, so the additional needed weight and space 
for shielding and equipment has yet to be established. FNA however has been proved 
effective in laboratory use and for applications such as bore-hole-oil-well logging. The 
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technique may also be applicable for the inspection of freight cargo, where personnel 
access and control can be significantly restricted. 
Pulsed Fast Neutron Analysis (FNA) 
A variant of the fast neutron analysis method of detection of explosives is the 
pulsed fast neutron analysis system. Here, the concept is the same as for PFNA, but 
lower energy neutrons may be used as a probe. The neutrons are sent out of the 
accelerator in short pulses as well collimated beams. At the lower energies, the overall 
gamma-ray production by nuclear reactions with explosive constituents such as oxygen, 
carbon, chlorine and nitrogen are about the same as for 14 MeV neutrons. However, the 
gamma-ray spectrum is much cleaner and shows a much better signal-to-noise ratio. By 
moving the neutron beam and / or the object being inspected, a two dimensional spatial 
map of the source of detected gamma rays from the atoms inside the baggage may be 
produced. A third dimension, the depth within the container that the reaction occurred, 
can be obtained from measuring the time between the pulse leaving the accelerator and 
the time of the arrival of the measured signal. This is possible because the neutrons have 
low enough speeds that time-of-flight is measurablesl. 
The d-d reaction requires a larger accelerator than the d-t reaction because the 
reaction cross sections (probabilities) are a smaller at the same incident deuteron kinetic 
81 For example, if the d-d reaction is used as the neutron source, the kinetic energy of the 
neutron is 2.48 MeV. The reaction for this process is d + d ( 3He + n + 3.3 MeV. The 
total energy released is 3.3 MeV with the neutron carrying 2.48 MeV and the 3He 
carrying 0.82 MeV. 3He is an isotope of helium with two protons and one neutron. The 
other stable isotope of helium is 4He or the - particle. The neutron speed is about 20,000 
kilometers per second, but with timing resolution of the order of a nanosecond (10-9 
seconds), spatial resolution of the order of two centimeters can be achieved. 
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energy. Pulsed time-of-flight analysis could also be done using 14 MeV neutrons from 
the d-t reaction. However, they provide a poorer signal-to-noise ratio and require 
heavier shielding. 
Pulsed fast neutron analysis, PFNA, is attractive because it provides unambiguous 
determination of the elemental composition characteristic of explosives. 
OTHER NUCLEAR DETECTION METHODS 
Although thermal neutron analysis, fast neutron analysis and pulsed neutron 
analysis are perhaps the most mature of the detection techniques using methods from 
nuclear physics, there are other exploratory concepts which have been proposed. The 
basic physics for these techniques are relatively well understood, however, the 
engineering to make them into effective operational systems has not been fully pursued. 
Associated Nuclear Particle Production 
The creation of the fast 14 MeV neutron using the deuterium-tritium reaction also 
creates a 3 MeV alpha particle. The direction of the neutron and the alpha particle are 
highly correlated=. Because the alpha particle is created within the accelerator system, 
its direction can be measured without interference from the baggage constituents. 
Likewise, when the neutron interacts with nuclei of the examined object, gamma rays 
82 The technique of measuring two events simultaneously is called coincidence 
measurements. The alpha-particle, the timing of the accelerator pulse, the gamma-ray 
and the neutrons can be detected in a correlated manner with the use of coincidence 
techniques. 
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may result. The direction and timing of the alpha particle can uniquely determine the 
timing and direction of the neutron. The direction and energy of the gamma ray and the 
time-of-flight information from the neutron can all be integrated to provide a three- 
dimensional mapping of the carbon, nitrogen and oxygen in the baggage. The correlation 
of the associated particles is adequate enough to see even small amounts of explosives. 
Nuclear Resonance Absorption (NRA) of Gamma Rays 
Nitrogen-14, 14N, has a sharply defined excited state which almost immediately 
after formation decays into carbon-13, 13C and a proton. The nitrogen excited state can 
be created with a gamma ray of a very specific energy, 9.17 million electron volts. In 
nuclear resonance absorption, a stream of gamma rays at the very specific energy, 9.17 
MeV, is made to impinge upon the luggage to be inspected. On the opposing side, a 
gamma ray is placed. As long as the luggage does not contain nitrogen, the gamma-ray 
intensity detected is relatively constant. When nitrogen is introduced between the source 
of the gamma rays and the detector, the detected intensity falls significantly because the 
gamma rays can be absorbed preferentially. The absorption is very specific to 14N and 
9.17 MeV y’s. The specificity arises because of resonances absorption. The reaction, 
which is exploited for NRA, is: 
y (9.172 MeV) + 14N + p + 13C 
83 Physical processes are resonant when a partatlar conditm such as energy, frequency, 
or speed exactly matches conditions to enhance an effect. In nuclear resonant absorption, 
NRA, the gamma ray energy must exactly match the excitation energy of the 14N 
nucleus. By analogy, you may have experienced resonant effects when driving on a tire 
which is not balanced. At certain speeds, the tire (and consequently, the car) will shake 
because the rotation frequency and the cause of the imbalanced tire create just the right 
conditions to enhance the instability. 
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The gamma rays of this specific energy are created by the inverse reaction with 
accelerated protons on a target of 13C nuclei. The inverse reaction to create the gamma 
ray is also created by a resonant condition. 
p (1.748 MeV kinetic energy) + I3C -+ 14N* + 14N +y (9.712 MeV) 
The * indicates that the 14N nucleus is first created in an excited state and the de- 
excitation of the I4N emits a gamma ray of the specific energy. 
The nuclear resonant absorption technique has the advantage of requiring a much 
smaller accelerator than for neutron production and requires much less shielding as 
gamma rays and protons are much easier to shield than are neutrons. However, at this 
time, the process is capable of observing the presence of only nitrogen, so false-alarm 
rates may be exceedingly high. The same objection can be made for thermal neutron 
analysis, however, TNA can use the 252Cf isotope, which is considerably less expensive 
than an accelerator. Resonant absorption advantages can be lost if the gamma-ray 
detector is not energy sensitive. The driving cost for the NFU method may turn out to be 
efficient energy gamma-ray detectors with sufficient energy resolution. 
Nitrogen-13 Production - Positron Emission Tomography 
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In this technique, a gamma ray beam activates the 14N isotope84 in explosives to 
an excited state of a radioactive isotope of nitrogen, 13N. A neutron, which for this 
application does not play a significant role, is also emitted. The reaction is: 
y + 14N + 13N* + n 
The nitrogen-13 decays with a ten minute half-life and emits a positron85 (the 
positively charged antiparticle of an electron.) Each positron immediately annihilates 
with an electron in that region and two back-to-back 5 1 1 -keV photons are emitted 86. 
5 1 1-keV photons are unique signatures of positron annihilation. The 
simultaneous detection of both of the photons (coincidence measurement) allows for 
tracing back the path of the two photons and determine the source of the positron. This 
allows for excellent spatial resolution allowing for the location of the explosive to within 
better than a centimeter in all three dimensions. 
84 In nature, 99.6 % of the nitrogen is 14N. The remainder is 15N. The radioactive 
isotopes of nitrogen is 13N with a half-life of 9.9 minutes. They would not be in 
existence before the irradiation with the gamma-ray. 
85 The laws of physics allow for the existence of matter and anti-matter. As we know it, 
our universe is composed primarily of matter. However, in certain reactions, we can 
allow for conditions where anti-matter appears. Anti-matter are identical to matter except 
that all the measurable properties except mass are opposite to that of matter. An electron 
which has a negative charge has a corresponding anti-electron which we call a positron. 
A positively charged protons have a corresponding negatively charged anti-proton. In 
effect the anti-particle is a mirror image of the particle. When you look at yourself in the 
mirror, the image appears to be you except certain properties have changed. The right- 
handed you appears left handed. 
When a particle and anti-particle meet, they annihilate each other. The overall energy and momentum 
must be the same before and after they meet In the case of the positron and electron, the most probable 
outcome are two photons whose energies are each equal to the rest mass energy of one of the positron and 
electron. They must go away from each other back-to-back since the momentum of each oppose other and 
the net momentum is zero, just as was the net momentum when the positron and electron came in contact 
with each other. 
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Because the radioactive nitrogen isotope has a ten-minute half-life, the irradiation 
and detection stations can be separated, reducing the background and simplifying 
considerably the detection system. 
The gamma rays are created by a specifically designed radio-frequency linear 
accelerator (RF-LINAC)87. The accelerator first accelerates an electron beam to about 
14 MeV energy. The electrons then strike a tantalum or tungsten target and produce 
gamma radiation with a maximum energy equal that of the electron beam. The gamma 
rays interact with the explosives and activate the nitrogen. 
Pulsed Neutron Backscatter (PNB) 
If fast neutrons interact with atomic nuclei in a manner such that the structure of 
the nucleus is not changed, then the neutrons will scatter in particular directions with its 
energy reduced by a unique amount depending on the species of the nucleus% 
Scattering from carbon, oxygen and nitrogen all produce different back-scattering 
velocities (energies). The intensity of the back-scattered signals provide information on 
87 LINAC is short for linear accelerator. Although they are thought of as nuclear and highenergy physics 
research tools, they are also found in many medical hospital for cancer treatment. The x-rays used for 
cancer treatment is generated in a manner very similar to the application here. 
88 Scattering in which the participants of the scattering do not suffer a structural change 
is called elastic. In the macroscopic world, the collisions of billiard balls are elastic 
collisions. Should the billiard balls crack, then the collision is inelastic. In the case of 
billiard balls, when the cue ball is scattered forward it has the minimum energy loss. 
When the cue ball is scattered exactly backward, the cue ball stops and all its energy is 
transferred to the struck ball. There is a direct correlation of energy transfer to the 
scattering angle. 
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the amount of different elements present, while the ratios between the signals from 
various elemental nuclei scatterers indicate the chemical composition of the substance. 
Explosives have specific chemical compositions, which can be detected by detecting the 
neutrons at specific angles and with specific energies. 
Nuclear Quadrupole Resonance Analysis 
The atomic nucleus is not necessarily spherical which causes the electric field 
about it to be unique to that particular shape. The atomic electrons about the nucleus see 
the effects of the nuclear shape, electric quadrupole moment, and also the effect of the 
magnetic moment of the nucleus. The orbits of the electrons are perturbed from that 
which might arise from a simple spherically charged nucleus. These electron orbit 
perturbations differ from one kind of molecular site to another and can give us a method 
of chemical identification. 
Quadrupole deformation of the nucleus is commonly found in many heavy atoms. 
Most light nuclei do not manifest this deformation, however, '%, which is found in most 
explosives, is an important example of a light atom behaving as if it possessed a non- 
spherical charge distribution. 
These other nuclear detection methods are still in the exploratory stage. Optimization for 
explosive detection require integration of accelerator and detector technologies. High 
detection probabilities and low false-alam rates are issues, which need continual 
improvement. 
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MILLIMETER WAVE DETECTION 
All objects emit electromagnetic radiation89 by the mere fact that they are at some 
finite temperature. The peak emission wavelengthg0 depends specifically on the 
temperature, but the body emits radiation a spectrum91 containing a continuous 
distribution of wavelengths. An object radiates92 more when it is hot than when it is 
89 Electromagnetic waves is the name given to waves which transfer energy from one 
place to another and include radar waves, radio and television waves, microwaves, 
infrared radiation, visible light, ultraviolet light to x-rays and gamma rays. Their 
behaviors are all governed by a single unified set of four equations called Maxwell's 
Equations. Prior to James Clerk Maxwell, 1831-1879, for whom the equations are 
named, electricity and magnetism were thought to be separate phenomena. That a 
relatively simple set of four equations can describe a variety of phenomena is truly one of 
the greatest discoveries of physics. ("Relatively simple" is a debatable adjective since the 
sophomore physics class which usually deals with electricity and magnetism has been the 
impediment to many budding engineers' and scientists' careers. 
90 The relationship between the temperature and the wavelength, A,, , at which it 
radiates most strongly is given by Wien's law: , A,, T = 2898 -m*K, where T is the 
absolute temperature expressed in Kelvin and the wavelength units are micrometers. 
This relationship tells us that the peak emission wavelength and the temperature are 
inversely related, so that the higher the temperature, the shorter the electromagnetic 
radiation's wavelength. The absolute temperature scale , Kelvin, has 0 degrees assigned 
to the theoretically lowest possible temperature and the same gradation as the centigrade 
or Celsius scale. Absolute zero in the Celsius scale is - 273 degrees. 
9l The spectrum of a radiator based solely on its temperature is described by the Planck 
distribution. The deduction of the formula for thermal radiation in 1900 is perhaps 
seminal works which led to the realization that quantum mechanics was the description 
necessary to describe objects at atomic scale. Max Planck (1857-1947) is truly one of the 
greatest "heroes" of modern physics. The relationship between the energy carried by 
single particle of light (quanta) and its frequency is given by E = hv ,  where E is the 
energy and v is the frequency. The constant h is called Planck's constant and is now 
known with exquisite precision. In any equation of physics, the appearance of Planck's 
constant is a definite indicator that the equation is dealing with quantum mechanics. 
92 The amount of energy at all wavelengths radiated per unit time per surface area of a body at a particular 
temperature is given by the Stefan-Boltzmann law of radiation. This law tells us that the rate of radiation is 
proportional to the fourth power of the absolute temperature of the object. 
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cool. For example, the radiated heat you feel from an oven is mostly in the infrared 
wavelengths, whereas the hotter electrical element glows in the visible wavelengths of 
red to orange. At even greater temperatures of a nuclear bomb fireball, the temperatures 
may reach tens of millions of degrees and the peak radiation is at much, much shorter 
wavelengths in the x-ray portion of the electromagnetic spectrum. 
All objects absorb radiation as well as radiate it. Some things absorb radiation 
faster than others. It is the color of the object that affects the rate of heat transfers by 
radiation. Black is most effective. For instance, most of us avoid wearing black clothing 
in the hot summer sun. Similarly, black asphalt in a parking lot will be hotter than the 
adjacent gray sidewalk on a sunny summer day, because black absorbs better than gray. 
The reverse is also true - that is, black radiates better gray. Thus on a clear summer 
night, the asphalt will be colder than the gray sidewalk, because black radiates the heat 
away more rapidly. An ideal radiator is the same color as an ideal absorber -jet black. 
An ideal absorber captures all the radiation that falls on it and radiates energy away 
depending on its temperature only. In contrast, white is a poor absorber and a poor 
radiator. A black object absorbs all the radiation falling upon it. In contrast, a white 
object reflects all radiation, like a perfect mirror. The ability to absorb or radiate 
electromagnetic radiation can be quantified with a parameter E, called the emissivity. 
For an object, emissivity depends upon the frequency of the radiation. At 
millimeter wave emissions, the human flesh has an extraordinarily high emissivity 
compared to the vast majority of other materials. Virtually all clothing is highly 
transparent to electromagnetic radiation at millimeter wavelengths. These characteristics 
are exploited in passive millimeter wave imaging. 
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Millimeter wave passive imaging technology offers the opportunity to detect 
metallic and non-metallic weapons, plastic explosives, drugs and other contraband 
concealed under clothing without the need for direct physical contact. Although the peak 
emission of the human body is at an infrared wavelength of approximately 10 micro- 
meters, direct observation at infrared wavelengths is not practical because of the poor 
transparency of most clothing. The human body is not a perfect blackbody, but it emits a 
spectrum akin to the Planck distribution, albeit modified differently at different 
wavelengths. Looking at the emitted radiation at millimeter wavelengths, several 
advantages become apparent. The wavelength is sufficiently short as to provide adequate 
resolutiong3 to distinguish features such as concealed weaponry. At these wavelengths, 
virtually all clothing94 is transparent. In addition, human flesh has high emissivity at 
millimeter wavelengths. The combinations of these three properties allows for "seeing" 
93 Resolution refers to the ability to discern details which are close together. When the 
wavelength of the interrogating radiation, whether it is acoustic or electromagnetic is 
much smaller than the object being interrogated, the features of the object can be 
discerned because diffraction effects (the wave self interference effects) are small. If the 
wavelength is of the same order of magnitude or larger than the object being interrogated, 
the details of the object may be blurred. In general, in order to see the presence of an 
object, the interrogating wavelength should be much smaller than the object. Millimeter 
wavelengths are smaller than the centimeter scale of firearms and explosives, so are 
usefbl for detection. 
94 If the clothing were coated with a conductive metal, it would be reflective to most 
electromagnetic radiation. However, most clothing is made of non-conductive insulating 
materials which are transparent to millimeter wavelength electromagnetic radiation. 
95 The wavelength chosen depends not only on the desired resolution, but also on the 
availability of detectors at that wavelength. Proprietary details include the exact nature of 
the focal plane detector array and the signal-processing algorithm required to present a 
visual display to the interrogator. Systems have been developed which operate at 94 
gigahertz (GHz) frequency. The relationship between wavelength and frequency is that 
the product of the two is equal to the speed of the wave. Assuming that the 
electromagnetic wave travels at the speed of light in vacuum (or air), 94 GHz 
corresponds to 3.2 mm, about one eighth of an inch. This wavelength satisfies the 
criterion that wavelength be smaller than the object being interrogated. 
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through clothing to the "naked" body. Weaponry, explosives or other contraband would 
block the natural millimeter wave emission from the body and they would be seen 
outlined against the human body. 
In practical implementation, passive millimeter wave detection systems can be 
packaged into a gateway scanner to scan passengers as they enter the waiting area. An 
advantage of the gateway scanner is that the portal walls surrounding the passenger can 
be covered with room temperature absorbers so that the imaging camera is provided with 
an uncluttered background for the image. Hand held scanners can be used in a manner 
similar to hand held metal detectors so that closer interrogation of a subject can be made 
for detailed localized searches of suspected areas. Video surveillance cameras can 
provide "real time'' inspection of an area. A disadvantage of the area video surveillance 
system is that background clutter may be greater than from a confined and controlled 
area. 
The millimeter detection method need not be passive. Active millimeter 
electromagnetic wave interrogation systems can be created in a manner similar to the use 
of radars. In this application, the different reflectivity properties of different objects are 
exploited and the determination of location, posture and activity of people in a room can 
be interrogated. These systems are sometimes called Through-the-Wall Imaging Systems 
(TWIS) and have potential for applications in hostage, terrorist, and drug bust situations. 
Here the wavelengths might be increased and the frequency decreased because detailed 
resolution is not as critical. In general longer wavelength electromagnetic radiation has 
greater transmission properties through most walls. An exception to this statement is 
pertains to ordinary kitchen microwave frequencies, which are designed to be absorbed 




1.5 GHz microwaves with 10 cm wavelength have been exploited in 
DETECTORS AND TECHNOLOGY, DISCUSSION 
The detectors and technologies discussed in this chapter have ranged into a 
myriad of topics, which at times do not appear to have a coherent theme. This is because 
the detection of explosives is not a straightforward endeavor. We have attempted not 
only to simply catalogue the various methods, but to also provide supporting 
commentary, especially in the footnotes, so that the basic ideas can be understood. 
Metal detectors, x-ray detectors and millimeter wave detection might have been 
grouped together in a single heading of sub-surface detection technologies. Vapor 
analysis including dogs and neutron techniques could have been grouped together under 
the heading of chemical detection. However, the differences and commonalties among 
the groupings could easily have been made in other ways. The critical goal in all of these 
techniques is the requirement to find an anomaly from objects, which are found in normal 
airport baggage, and to detect a method of identification. 
Beyond the detection and identification requirements, the detection systems must 
also be aware of passenger concerns. Not only throughput and passenger inconvenience, 
but concerns such as radiation safety and privacy issues need to be considered. Again, 
we emphasize that all aspects of explosive detection systems need to be considered 
before implementation into the aviation industry. 
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The listing of detectors and technologies is by no means exhaustive. We have not 
discussed methods, which may use biological techniques such as imrnunoassay. There is 
credible work being done in using trained swarms of bees to detect explosives and 
contraband. Certain microbes fluoresce after encounter with certain explosive molecules 
such as TNT. Whether such a method is sufficiently "user friendly" in the airport 
scenario remains to be seen, but one needs to keep a receptive mind towards ideas which 
may at first glance appear nonsensical. The use of dogs and mechanical smelling 
techniques would have not too long ago appeared impractical in many circles. Today, 
they are approaching feasibility for routine use. Other methods and ideas will appear and 
the difficult task of the decision-maker is to determine the weighting of resources to 






In addition to the direct investigation of luggage, there are other means which can 
enhance aviation safety and limit opportunities for introduction of firearms and 
explosives onto aircraft. This chapter briefly mentions these other topics in order to 
emphasize that the problem of aviation security requires a system solution, which 
considers all available means. Some of these topics are administrative and procedural; 
others can evoke quite sensitive public response% unless conducted with extreme 
awareness of privacy and civil liberty issues. 
PASSENGER PROFILING 
Some people believe that airlines should "profile" passengers and subject only 
those who "fit the profile" of terrorists to heightened security measures. In general, there 
are two types of profiling: by interviewing and by automated computer evaluation. 
Different profiles would be employed, depending on whether a flight was domestic or 
international. The specific criteria are kept secret, but among many it is thought that 
these criteria are not so closely held. Currently, passengers are asked a series of 
questions such as whether they packed their own bags and whether they have maintained 
. 
For example, a fairly comprehensive discussion of issues is contained in the 14 
January 1997 statement of the Legislative Counsel of the American Civil Liberties 
Union, Washington D.C. on "Civil Liberties Implications of Aviation Security Passenger 
Profiling before the International Conference on Aviation Safety and Security in the 21st 
Century." At the heart of the matter is the prohibition against unreasonable search and 
seizure as provided by the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution. 
Amendment IV: "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, 
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no 
warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and 
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized." 
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it within their view since it was packed. They are asked to identify themselves with 
oficial documentation such as a driver's license or passport. The responses elicited, the 
nervousness of the passenger, as well as secret criteria which might include ethnic origin, 
appearance, etc., can trigger varying degrees of heightened security interrogation. 
Profiling has been presented as an attempt to eliminate from further scrutiny, 
passengers who do not present a risk. Opponents of profiling have claimed there are 
other effects such as stereotyping and discrimination of certain categories of persons with 
unacceptable consequences. Even being selected for further interrogation subjects the 
"selectee" to stigmatization by fellow passengers. 
Arguments against passenger profiling claim that profiling can never be effective 
because the incidence of aviation terrorism is so rare that the statistics of small numbers 
dominate. Profiling looks for the last event and historical evidence is that consistent 
patterns do not emerge. "Profiles tend to turn up the same ''usual suspects'' time and time 
again. Their characteristics that triggered the heightened security measures often do not 
change. The usual suspects, though, aren't guilty. Rounding up the usual suspects may 
have been "O.K." in the movie Casablanca, but should not be "O.K." in America." 
PRIVACY ISSUES 
"X-ray vision" raises questions of privacy. In principle, both backscatter x-ray 
and millimeter wave detection systems have the ability to ''see through" clothing, and 
with sufficient data processing, to reveal anatomical details of a person. Because of this 
possibility, operational system.s may have to be degraded from its ultimate capability. 
Male and female interrogation may need to be conducted separately. Their use may have 
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to be curtailed to those instances where competent authority has a "reasonable suspicion" 
to justi@ more detailed interrogation. Concerns about the definition of illegal search and 
seizure and unreasonable intrusion of privacy are issues which need to considered before 
the introduction of such interrogation. devices. If systems are employed which are 
passive and do not require the person being interrogated to know that they are the subject 
of interrogation, civil liberty concerns need to be addressed with care. 
PASSENGER BAGGAGE MATCHING 
It is assumed that terrorists, in general, are not on suicide missions. The 
likelihood of explosives carried in checked baggage is considerably diminished if the 
owner of the bags is onboard the same airplane. Positive passenger baggage matching 
programs have been instituted to achieve that goal. The first step in this process is the 
questioning at the check-in counter where a photo identification card is requested and the 
passenger is asked if the packing were done by them and if the bags have been in their 
possession continuously. The task is not easy even if only international travel is checked. 
Domestic positive passenger baggage matching is a non-trivial task since 100 per cent 
matching would involve billions of bags on more than 12 million domestic flights each 
Year. 
In order to have a manageable system the White House Commission on Aviation 
Safety and Security recommended a layered interrogation approach requiring increased 
scrutiny be adopted. Such a system would be initiated with passenger profiling. 
Safeguards need to exist so that profile should not contain or be based upon material of 
constitutionally suspect nature, e.g. race, religion, national origin of U.S. citizens. 
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Again, the challenges encountered include minimizing passenger delays and being 
sensitive to stereotyping. 
Technology needs to be incorporated in order to make this a workable reality. 
Currently, bar codes are assigned to each baggage tag to match ticket stubs. The 
difficulty arises in insuring that the passenger who owns each bag being loaded boards 
the flight. Enhancements may include capabilities to incorporate positive photo 
identification directly with the bags. Other challenges occur during stopovers. 
Currently, the matching of passengers to luggage is "administrative" (not actual) 
because some of the airline reservation systems are not compatible with the luggage 
sorting and loading system and information is not collected or verified at the aircraft on 
the flight ramp. These system compatibility problems become more complex when one 
considers interline transfer bags and compatibility between different airline systems. 
Curbside and passenger counter check-in and luggage sorting areas can be viewed 
as fixed elements in the passenger baggage matching system. However, when baggage is 
being transferred from one airplane to another, a mobile positive passenger match system 
may be required. Among technologies, which might be applicable for this situation, are 
radio frequency (RF) linked readers and transmitters of barcode information. Sufficient 
information must be made available in order to allow identification of the bags with the 
passenger manifest, which must be checked against the boarding passes. 
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INTEGRATION OF BAGGAGE INSPECTION SYSTEMS 
The assignment of an acceptable minimum level of security may not address the 
true capability of a system to detect explosives, because the assignment of the figure of 
merit must be conducted a somewhat artificial scenario. In effect, the normal state is that 
there are no explosives and, consequently, both ineffective and effective systems would 
both satisfy the requirement of preventing introduction of explosives onto a plane. In the 
event of a real attempt to introduce a hazard onto a plane, the success and failure of the 
explosive detection system depends on many factors. They include the type of hazard, 
the training of personnel, the mechanical capabilities of the device, the time allotted for 
interrogation, luck, etc., etc. The difficult task faced by decision makers is what 
requirements, procedures, and equipment should be allocated to insure a cost-effective 
safety capability. In this context, cost must also include passenger inconvenience. 
Procedures may include decisions as to what percentage of luggage require scrutiny at 
different levels. 
The automatic explosive detection systems being introduced have different 
throughput capabilities. Because detectors have different capabilities, a protocol must be 
established to have a layering of systems so that time intensive interrogation is reserved 
for those which have already failed (or passed, depending on one's perspective) another 
detector's criterion. For example, computerized tomography x-ray scanners should not be 
taken for every bag that enters the system since they require a considerable amount of 
time. Operationally, decisions may be based upon airport structure, physical space, 
baggage flow, passenger flow, environment, capital cost and operational costs. Because 
the requirement is for the whole system to be optimized, technology decisions may be 
required for the choice of conveyers, carts, diverters, and adjustment capabilities to 
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accommodate different peak load requirements. 
decisions as to whether centralized or decentralized systems should be incorporated. 
These decisions may also influence 
BLAST RESISTANT LUGGAGE CONTAINERS 
The inherent goal of any aircraft is to maximize the number of passengers and 
their baggage to be carried to a particular destination. In general, any weight carried to 
enhance aircraft functions is weight which diminishes the load capacity. Consequently, 
tk. Qeneral aircraft design philosophy has been to minimize aircraft weight. This has 
resulted in aircraft being very vulnerable to internal blasts, since internal explosions have 
not been a normal concern. Some studies indicate that it would not have taken an 
extraordinary amount of material to mitigate the explosion which brought down Pan Am 
103 in 1988. Blast resistant luggage containers are being designed to harden aircraft 
against internal explosions. In order for blast resistant luggage containers to be 
acceptable to the aviation community, they must have reasonable tare weight and unit 
cost, have high durability, easy maintainability and minimum impact on airline 
operations. 
New materials are being developed for such purposes as airframes and bullet 
proof vests, which may be of utility for luggage container manufacture. Material 
considerations are not the only concerns. Designed compartmentalization of luggage 
space may be a factor in mitigation of blast effects. Technical decisions are driven by the 
administrative decision as to how large an explosion that the container must withstand. 
The development of blast resistant luggage containers will require system optimization. 
A totally blast resistant container may weigh too much and container no space. The 
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We no longer live in a world in which our only concern when boarding an 
airplane is whether the flight schedule is maintained. The traveling public should not 
suffer inordinately from anxiety concerning the possibility of terrorist acts. However, the 
air travel system must provide the environment so that the possibility of terrorism on 
board aircraft is minimized. But the accomplishment of this goal requires the recognition 
that security and transport of passengers to their destinations may sometimes be 
competing concerns. 
This book hopefklly has provided an introduction to the subject of explosive 
detection in aviation security, so that the educated non-specialist can appreciate the many 
topics which impinge upon a wise decision-making. A historical introduction gives us an 
appreciation for the need to implement explosive detection systems. In order to 
understand what the detector is supposed to detect, some appreciation for explosives in 
general and their effects has been provided. The bulk of the document deals with 
different detectors and their underlying science and technology. The final chapter 
emphasizes the need for recognition that it is the total system, not simply a component of 
the system which much work in order to insure the general public a safe and comfortable 
trip. 
The author hopes that his document is of interest to many levels of aduiences. 
Hopefully, it can be used as a starting point to allow a few individuals to perform their 
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